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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE REVOLUTION
MUST BE TELEVISED

According to some old trade press reports, former Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") Chairman Reed Hundt was at one time
going to publish a book, tentatively titled "You Say
You Want A Revolution?"' Since the title isn't being used at the moment, let's borrow it for a look
at the alleged enthusiasm for competition in local
telephony and the expectation that broadband
commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS"), including cellular, broadband personal communica-

tions services ("PCS") and Enhanced Specialized
Mobile Radio ("ESMR") providers,2 are positioned to bring competition to local telephony in
the way that policymakers desire.
A significant number of new carriers, including
cable television providers, are investing in local
telecommunications facilities and have the potential to bring facilities-based competition to local
telephony. But recent events also evidence an interest in the potential of broadband CMRS carriers to bring competition to local telephone service markets. 3 Specifically, as the FCC has noted,
I See Reed Hundt: Mr. Chairman (visited Apr. 5, 1999)
<data.com/25years/reed_hundt.html>.
2
In this article, I use the term broadband CMRS to refer
specifically to those services defined as CMRS services under
the Communications Act and identified by the FCC as likely
substitutes for traditional wireline telephony. See 47 U.S.C.
§332(d)(1); In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332
of the Communications Act, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 1411, 1435, para. 54-55 (1994) [hereinafter CMRS Second Report and Order]. The terms "wireless telephony" or "mobile telephony" are meant to be used interchangeably with
broadband CMRS and are distinguished from other CMRS or
wireless services such as paging, mobile satellite services or
fixed microwave. See id.
3
See, e.g., In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Wireless Telecommunications
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 25,132,
para. 47 (1998); Sugrue Named Chief of the Wireless Bureau,
COMM. DAILY, Dec. 7, 1998; In re Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC
Rcd. 21,252, 21,277, para. 44 (1998) ("We seek comment on
the extent to which our rules facilitate the provision of services eligible for universal service support by providers, such
as wireless . . .that historically have not supplied such serv-

ices."); In re Calling Party Pays Service Option in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of Inquiry, 12 FCC Rcd.
17,693, 17,693, para. 1 (1997) (stating that the FCC is "committed to taking necessary actions to increase consumer options for local telephone service"); In re Amendment of the
Commission's Rules to Permit Flexible Service Offerings in
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965,
8967, para. 3 (1996) ("by giving CMRS providers greater flexibility.., we establish a framework that will stimulate wireless
competition in the local exchange market"). See also Michele
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many analysts believe that CMRS, especially mobile telephony, may become a direct competitor
to wireline telephone service. Therefore, as
CMRS services become more prominent in the
telecommunications marketplace, questions have
arisen concerning public policy responsibilities.
"The Commission, along with the CMRS industry,
is currently addressing issues related to public service obligations for CMRS providers that wireline
carriers are required to provide. This process involves crafting regulations that minimize burdens
but still act to encourage CMRS providers to enhance their services in ways that serve the public." 4

This article focuses on issues surrounding the
expansion of service by CMRS providers. Unlike
interexchange carriers ("IXCs"), cable television
or other new entrants, broadband CMRS networks and billing systems are already technically
capable of providing telecommunications access
to the home or even to a particular individual per5
son for certain mobile broadband services.
Therefore, the acquisition of facilities from the incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") is not
C. Farquhar, Jump-Starting Wireless Competition in the Local
Telecom Market, Presentation at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") Wireless Local Loop Forum, Dec. 17, 1997 (describing obstacles to wireless local loop as a competitor to wireline local exchange
service); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Announces the Addition of a Wireless Representative to Serve
on Rural Task Force, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd. 20,834
(1998).
4 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and
Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Third Report, 13 FCC Rcd.
19,746, 19,755 (1998) [hereinafter Third Competition Report].
5 Some believe that wireless could not only serve as an
economic substitute for local telephone service, but that
fixed wireless technology would eventually replace the
twisted pairs of copper wires used as local "loops" connecting
homes and businesses to the landline switches. See GEORGE
CALHOUN, WIRELESS ACCESS AND THE LOCAL TELEPHONE NET-

383-84, 547 (1992); Terrence McGarty, The Economic
Viability of Wireless Local Loop and its Impact on Universal Service,
presented at the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information
(Oct. 1996); Paula Bernier, Waitingfor the Wireless Local Loop
to Roll, INTERACTIVE WEEK, Sept. 15, 1997, <www.zdnet.com/
intweek/print/970915/inwkOO03.htm>. Given the FCC's rational inclination to treat fixed wireless services offered by
CMRS carriers as CMRS, this article's discussion of "broadband CMRS" services is intended to encompass both fixed
and mobile services. See generally In re Amendment of the
Commission's Rules to Permit Flexible Service Offerings in
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, First Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965 (1996)
[hereinafter CMRS Flexible Use Notice].
WORK
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the same obstacle as it is for other new entrants,
although broadband CMRS does require just and
reasonable interconnection arrangements with
the ILEC and other carriers in order to provide a
robust level of service.
Accordingly, policymakers may expect broadband CMRS carriers to enter the local exchange
market and compete for customer subscriptions
and universal service subsidies, in return for certain obligations. In other words, the assumption
is CMRS providers will assume (or duplicate) the
"carrier of last resort" role presently occupied by
ILECs. Another common assumption is, because
broadband CMRS is used by a larger portion of
the public, it should be treated identically to
other local exchange carriers or subject to similar
regulations regardless of whether it is subsidized.
Except for unique circumstances in some niche
markets, these assumptions are fundamentally incorrect. For broadband CMRS carriers to put
competitive pressure on incumbent wireline local
exchange carriers ("LECs"), the policy changes
that occur must clearly establish a "pro-competitive, deregulatory" framework and not attempt to
develop CMRS firms into wireless LECs. In addition, encouraging CMRS providers to enhance
their services in ways that serve the public 6 involves allowing the public itself to demand price
and service innovations and allowing the competitive market forces in the CMRS industry to compel a response, not issuing government mandates
on how the public should be served. Government
mandates represent a market outcome of a political process, one in which consumer influence is
not necessarily proportionately represented.
Competitive service markets provide consumers
with a far better means to obtain the prices and
services they want than the indirect method of
seeking government action.
The primary issue affecting the ability of broadband CMRS services to compete with wireline telephony service is price. 7 On the CMRS side,
competition and technological advancements will
continue to bring mobile prices down; this is not
an area where government action or telecommunications policy is really operative. To encourage
mobile telephony to become a better competitor
for wireline telephone service, policy changes

should move toward the elimination of subsidies
between carriers and the elimination of regulations premised upon the traditional monopoly
perspective of wireline common carrier regulation. Regulatory parity may eventually be possible, but only as a consequence of deregulation as
wireline carriers' market power is reduced. The
revolution we should be trying to achieve is one
that will set the regulatory bar lower, not higher,
to bring consumers still more benefits of competition.
CMRS carriers have a responsibility to serve
consumers well and to develop their businesses
based on sound, independent judgment. Expectations that broadband CMRS carriers will function as local competitors within the wireline
model or seek universal service eligibility in order
to compete via subsidies are misplaced. Competitive businesses want an environment where subsidies are neither given nor received and investment decisions are made using private financial
models. This article will show that the traditional
wireline LEC business model-exchanging subsidies in return for increased social obligations-is
not compatible with a competitive market approach.
The primary determinant of whether CMRS
carriers will win access lines away from ILECs, particularly for basic residential and small business
users, is whether CMRS services are price-competitive. At the moment, however, wireline LEC services are subsidized at below-cost rates, while the
costs of such subsidies are paid for by their competitors. This obviously frustrates competition
and deters the growth of wireless services. This
article will show that a fully competitive, deregulated approach to basic residential telecommunications pricing is a necessary adjunct to fuller
competitive pressure on wireline local services
from CMRS carriers.
At present, enthusiasm for a fully competitive,
deregulated approach is somewhat reserved.
While the 1996 Act's preamble professes support
for a pro-competitive, deregulatory approach, the
Act is at best "pre-competitive" rather than "procompetitive." This article argues that the way forward is for policymakers to explore ways to
achieve political consensus and support for new

6

Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to

7

Commercial Mobile Services, Second Report, 12 FCC Rcd.
11,266 (1997) [hereinafter Second Competition Report].

See Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at 19,755.
See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and
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ways to support universal service without taxes
and subsidies between competitors, and to become more comfortable with the competitive
business model for infrastructure investment and
service pricing. The long-term goal should be to
move further away from the regulated monopoly
model toward complete deregulation and full
competition for all telecommunications services,
wireless and wireline.
A.

What Will the Revolution Look Like?

Local competition from broadband CMRS
providers will likely first evolve not in the form of
full "line substitution," consumers abandoning a
wireline subscription and using wireless full-time,
but competitive pressure from "call substitution"
or "minute migration." Most consumers will, for
the moment, retain their landline phone service
for its cheap local calling option, but will also
purchase CMRS for the added advantage of mobility. As CMRS prices come down, CMRS services
will be used by more and more individuals, and
those individuals will use CMRS services for a
higher percentage of telephone calls.
Even now, some form of competitive substitution of wireless for landline is taking place. Calls
that formerly would have waited for a landline or
public phone to be available are made on mobile
phones. In many cases, the CMRS rate for an intra-LATA toll call is already less expensive than
the wireline rate. Specifically, Merrill Lynch estimates that wireless will capture 7.3 percent of the
total telecommunications minutes of use for the
year 2000, up from 1.7 percent in 1993.8 1993
also saw 1.412 trillion total minutes of use, and
that is expected to grow to 2.014 trillion in the
year 2000. 9' With regard to revenues, wireless was
about 6.3 percent of total telecom revenues in
1993 but is expected to capture 14.7 percent of
total revenues by 2000."' Even with the advent of
the Internet, home faxes and other home office
uses, wireless captures over 60 percent of total net
access line additions."l
This shows that minutes are migrating to wireless largely because customers are supplementing,
not replacing, their landline services with wireless.
This has some potential to put competitive pres8

The Next Generation 11, Merrill Lynch Report (Mar. 10,

1998) at 31-32.
9

See id.
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sure on access charges as more and more consumers utilize mobile phones for long-distance and intra-LATA toll calling, bypassing the wireline access
charges for origination and termination
(although not necessarily bypassing wireline facilities). As consumers migrate minutes from wireline to wireless networks, wireless networks will increase in value, because they will have a larger
number of connected users. But minute migration is not, by itself, going to bring the type of
competition that policymakers are most interested in. Normally, minute migration would put
competitive pressure on wireline companies to reduce prices, but that is impossible because local
telephone services are already offered at subsidized, below-cost rates for unlimited usage in the
local area.
The competitive impact of wireless will be most
significant to the extent that it represents substitution and not simply additional telecommunications traffic. Line substitution of wireless for wireline services would go farther in reducing ILEC
market power over local connections, not only giving consumers true choices with respect to local
call origination and termination but reducing
ILEC market power with respect to network access
to those consumers. Where a customer relinquishes a landline LEC subscription exclusively in
favor of a broadband CMRS service, the wireline
LEC no longer controls access to that customer
and can no longer anti-competitively advantage itself with respect to long-distance or other services
purchased by that customer.
Eventually all carriers, including the Bell Operating Companies, will offer both local and longdistance calling under a variety of rate plans. The
distinctions between "local" and "long-distance"
calling areas will become simply yet another variable in the different service offerings of telecommunications competitors, both wireless and wireline. CMRS carriers are most likely to offer service
packages that do not recognize "local" and "longdistance" as separate product markets the way
traditional wireline service regulation does. Accordingly, many regulations applicable to wireline
carriers simply make no sense when applied to
broadband CMRS; among these are regulations

l0

See id.

11

See id. at 34.
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that assume the existence of a local/long-distance
or intrastate/interstate dichotomy.
Accordingly, broadband CMRS carriers are not
likely to evolve into the equivalent of wireline
LECs in the way that regulators may imagine, nor
should they be subject to LEC obligations, particularly those originating in the historical monopoly-based system for ILEC regulation. The
"revolution" will look quite different from simply
more ILECs without wires. Government-defined
service area classifications, such as Local Access
and Transport Area ("LATA") boundaries will
give way to carrier-defined calling plan options.
LEC/IXC interconnection arrangements will simply become carrier-to-carrier interconnection
agreements, negotiated on the same basis as other
interconnection agreements. Access charges will
eventually become a relic of the past. However,
for this rosy scenario of competing, facilitiesbased carriers to develop extensively, further
changes in telecommunications pricing and policy will be necessary.
B.

What Is To Be Done?

Line substitution requires customers to make a
favorable price comparison between their overall
monthly bill for wireline service, local and longdistance, and the monthly cost of broadband
CMRS service, factoring in the additional benefits
of mobility. Even factoring in reductions in longdistance service prices through access charge and
universal service reform, the fact that local wireline service continues to be subsidized presents a
competitive obstacle to line substitution. Eventually, technological development could bring the
costs of broadband CMRS to a point where they
can be competitive with subsidized wireline service, i.e., below the subsidized price of wireline
service. However, to date this has not taken place.
Whether technology will be sufficiently ad12 See Seth Schiesel, AT&T to Offer Single Rate for All
Users, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at Cl. The AT&T "Personal
Network" plan costs $30 per month as a flat fee with a oneyear contract commitment required. The AT&T plan also allows for a single bill for all services, including an AT&T In-

vanced to provide a mobile telephone service with
competitive broadband capabilities at costs below
wireline is highly uncertain and not viable as a
short-term solution to the local telephone competition issue. With a few select policy changes, competition need not wait for such uncertainties.
Moreover, eliminating the market distortions
caused by subsidy flows within the local telephone
industry will better serve consumers in the long
run.
Broadband CMRS services are doing their part
to try and become price competitive with wireline;
prices are falling due to intense competition for
market share among wireless carriers. Broadband
CMRS carriers are introducing lower rates and
bundled packages of minutes. They offer not only
the premium benefit of mobility but all of the advanced vertical features consumers have come to
expect, such as caller ID and voice mail, among
other things. Wireless services offer larger "local"
calling areas or even nationwide calling without
extra charges and are price competitive with
many interexchange toll services. For example,
AT&T has introduced a number of novel plans,
one of which offers a single rate of 10 cents a minute for all calls, wireline and wireless, made from
a "home" area to anywhere in the country another which offers nationwide calling without
long-distance or roaming fees for a monthly fee of
around $90.00.12
Few consumers make a sufficient number of
long-distance calls to make wireless price-competitive with wireline at this time. Pricing bundles
and "one-rate" plans with nationwide service areas
will make wireless far more attractive as a replacement for traditional wireline service. AT&T's efforts, in particular the concept of a single home
or local area for both wireline and wireless and
single billing for both services, will help initiate
the psychological changes that enable more and
more consumers to visualize using a wireless

as their Internet provider. AT&T's Digital One wireless plan,

Wireless has followed suit with a comparable set of offers: the
GTE "HomeChoice plan offers 14 cents per minute for longdistance calls originating in the home area, with the opportunity to expand the home area to a larger level for an additional $15 per month. GTE's "AmericaChoice" plan, similar
to the Digital One AT&T plan, eliminates roaming and domestic long-distance charges where customers purchase 650

by contrast, offers 600 minutes of wireless service anywhere in

minutes for $95 per month. See TELECOMM. REP.

the country for a flat monthly fee of $89.99. The "Personal
Network" plan is expected to introduce many more residential consumers to using wireless and wireline interchangeably; here, to obtain them from the same carrier. See id. GTE

29, 1999. These plans, of course, are still no competition for
wireline service, where unlimited local calling is available for

ternet Access account where a customer has selected AT&T

as little as $10 per month. See id.
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phone exclusively. But if there is to be a revolution, there are a number of steps necessary for
even further competition from wireless that require significant policy changes in,the direction
of greater competition and deregulation, e.g.,
wireline "rate rebalancing.' 3 Here, the issues are
also psychological; they are far more political than
economic.

14

The political and policy reasons for the present
situation are, ironically, both obvious and ignored. That is, the reasons for the lack of price
competition in local services are obvious to most
economists but studiously ignored by policymakers. For the moment, local wireline services remain protected from competition through subsi13
The term "rate rebalancing" generally refers to the
process of eliminating the cross-subsidy given to local exchange services from other telecommunications services by
raising local exchange rates to reflect a more appropriate
share of LEC costs and thus encourage competitive entry and
substitution.
14 Any doubt as to the influence of politics in the present
telecommunications policy debate should be put to rest by
examining the increase in telecom firms' expenditures for
lobbying and campaign contributions in the last few years.
Telecommunications political contributions for the 1997-98
election cycle were 52 percent higher than for the last nonpresidential election cycle (1993-94). $2.7 million in contributions were distributed between October 1995 and February 1996, the height of debate on the 1996 Telecommunications Act. "Rate rebalancing" is one of the most politically
sensitive issues: the largest recipient of telecommunications
donations at the state level went to the Florida Republican
Party at a time when that state was considering legislation to
rebalance local telephone rates. See Mike Mills, The Bells (and
Others) Are Ringing, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., Dec. 14,
1998, at 18.
15 As with many multi-product firms, the facilities used to
provide local telephony are also used to provide other services such as access to long-distance, Internet and wireless
services. Economic questions regarding the appropriate
share of the total costs to be allocated to a given service are,
not surprisingly, subject to a number of different answers.
There is widespread agreement, however, that local service
intentionally bears less than a reasonable share of its costs.
See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8784, para. 11 (1997)
[hereinafter May 1997 Universal Service Order]; JERRY HAUS-
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dies that allow those services to be priced below

15
any reasonable measure of their share of costs.

Most economists understand that it is unreasonable to expect significant competitive entry into local exchange markets where the prices of local
residential wireline services are set at levels below
any reasonable measure of an appropriate share
of the costs attributable to local service and in fact
subsidized through taxes on potential competitors. 16 "Rebalancing" those rates to more accu-

rately reflect the costs of individual services would
encourage competition and increase efficiency by
sending better price signals to competitors.
In the European Community, rate rebalancing
has been considered a necessary and fundamental
pared for the U.S. Telephone Association July 16, 1993). But
see HATFIELD ASSOCIATES, THE COST OF BASIC UNIVERSAL SERVICE (1994) (suggesting a lower amount). Although an eco-

nomic measure of the portion of costs to be borne by local
service prices could be calculated based on subscriber use
data, state regulatory commission decisions about the size of
this portion intentionally allocate higher portions of costs to
the interstate jurisdiction in order to keep local costs low. See
generally In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 3 F.C.C. 2d 307, 309-11 (1966) (adopting a Separations Manual and stating the historical reasons for its adoption); In re Prescription of Procedures for Separating and Allocating Plant Investment, Operating Expenses, Taxes, and
Reserves Between the Intrastate and Interstate Operations of
Telephone Companies, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C. 2d 317,
330 (1969). The requirement to divide costs among jurisdictions stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Illinois Bell, 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930). Recently, Congress and
the FCC have begun efforts to make some of the costs of
these subsidies more explicit and to recover the costs
through taxes on all telecommunications carriers, rather
than just interexchange carriers. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §254;
May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776; see also In
reJurisdictional Separations Reform and Referral to the Federal-State Joint Board, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC
Rcd. 22,120 (1997) (describing the most recent FCC efforts
at separations reform); In reAccess Charge Reform Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, Third Report and Order and Notice of Inquiry, 11 FCC Rcd. 21,354 (1996).
16
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Prospectsfor Deregulation in Telecommunications, Remarks to the Federal Communications

sef Spiegel, The PoliticalEconomy of Entry into Local Exchange

Commission, May 30, 1997 <www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/
Speeches/jfU50997.html> ("In telecommunications, some
end-users currently are charged below cost-in some cases
much below cost. This kind of entitlement creates competi-

Markets, QUALITY AND

tive problems if those subsidies are funded by implicit cross-

MAN, TAXATION BY TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE ECONOMICS OF

THE E-RATE, (AEI Press 1998); Bhaksar Chakravorti and YosRELIABILITY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN-

43, at 44 (William Lehr ed., 1995)
(Chakravorti and Spiegel show that Pacific Bell charged
$8.35 per month for basic local service, while its marginal
costs were estimated to be $22 per month). The total cost of
such subsidies has been estimated at approximately $20 billion per year. See Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile: A Race for
Local Telecommunications Competition Policy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J.
105, 120 (1995); Calvin Monson &Jeff Rohlfs, The $20 Billion
Impact of Local Competition in Telecommunications, (study preFRASTRUCTURE

subsidies from other users who pay above cost, or if they are
funded explicitly but not all competitors are equally able to
receive the subsidy"). See also Gail Lawyer, Rural Retreat,
TELE.COM (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <www.teledotcom.com/
0698/features/tdc0698coverl.html> ("There is growing
doubt that the free-market approach, in which competition
acts as the primary mechanism to drive down prices, is consistent with the universal service goals put forth in the Telecom
Act").
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aspect of liberalizing telecommunications markets
and opening them to competition. The persistence of artificially low tariff prices for local services is considered by European policymakers to be
"damaging a dynamic source of overall growth. 17
They have directed that all telecommunications
service providers "rebalance" tariffs to align them
with costs. 18
But these obvious reasons are largely ignored
because any correction to the competitive obstacle is seen as politically untenable. Policymakers
expect a popular backlash if wireline local service
rates increase and have established maintaining
the local service price ceiling as a top priorityeven above promoting competition or economic
efficiency. Put plainly, the enthusiasm for local
competition in theory vastly exceeds the actual effort expended on making necessary changes that
will allow it to happen, or at least allow it to happen in the shorter time frames public statements
suggest are desired. This tepid enthusiasm for
competition is evident in the 1996 Act. Full embrace of a competitive approach will increase the
chances that a local competition revolution will
occur, particularly one led by broadband CMRS
services.
Both the framework of the 1996 Act and the
policy decisions made to implement it are not
"pro-competitive," they are "pre-competitive."
Regulators have simply not yet fully embraced a
"pro-competitive, deregulatory" approach to local
telephony, while broadband CMRS carriers have
grown in and do operate in a fully competitive
market and make business decisions according to
processes very different than traditional LECs.
The present approach to local competition is to
17

Towards a Dynamic Economy-Green Paper on the

Development of the Common Market for Telecommunication Services and Equipment, COM 290, at 50 (June
30,1987).
18 See European Commission Directive 96/19/EEC of 13
Mar. 1996 amending Directive 90 388 EEC with regard to the
implementation of full competition in telecommunications
markets (OJ 1 74/13, 22.03.96), at para. 20. ("Artificially low
prices, however, impede competition because potential com-

petitors have no incentive to enter into the relevant segment
of the voice telephony market and are contrary to Article 86
of the Treaty, as long as they are not justified under Article
90 (2) of the Treaty as regards specific identified end-users

or groups of end-users. Member States should phase out as
rapidly as possible all unjustified restrictions on tariff

rebalancing by the telecommunications organizations.");
Commission Communication on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal

Service in Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Mem-

try and license more LECs for a given market
area, give them access to the same subsidies, compensate for the ILECs' economies of scale by requiring network unbundling, but generally to
keep the same regulatory approach for the competitors as that designed for the incumbentssubsidies in exchange for service obligations and
oversight.
Many regulators may therefore imagine that
CMRS carriers will create additional local competition either as a fixed wireless "CLEC" or other
arrangement whereby a CMRS carrier assumes
"LEC" regulatory status. But it is in fact the threat
of LEC regulation, including state and local regulation, that is part of the deterrent to CMRS carriers developing both fixed and mobile service offerings that more directly compete in the local
exchange market. Wireline and wireless service
businesses arose from different origins, subscribe
to different values, have different cultures and follow different models for doing business.
Policymakers should begin with the understanding that CMRS carriers operate in a highly
competitive market and should remain free of the
old monopoly-based systems of regulation and
subsidy in order to grow most effectively and create better value for consumers. "Regulatory parity" is not necessary. In one direction, it would
simply saddle CMRS carriers with unnecessary
regulations intended to address instances of ILEC
market power. Rather, the transition toward regulatory parity should take the form of deregulation of CMRS carriers.
Congress, the FCC and state commissions have
embraced a competitive, "subsidy-free" zone for
the Internet.' 9 Policymakers should be equally
ber States, COM (96) 608, at Annex B (Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter European Universal Service Guidelines] (prohibiting
member states from recovering the costs of an access deficit
contribution attributable to unbalanced national tariff structures in a national universal service plan).
19 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,638 (1998)
(dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold FurchtgottRoth).
For over a year now, the United States has made it a matterlof national policy to encourage other nations to es-

chew [i]nternet regulation and taxation. Ira Magaziner,
on behalf of President Clinton, won broad bipartisan
support for the report in which he concluded that the

Internet should remain free of such burdens. To introduce our own form of Internet regulation and fees at
this point would be the height of hypocrisy and would
set a terrible precedent for other countries to follow.
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careful to preserve the competitive CMRS market
and-avoid the temptation to initiate broadband
CMRS carriers as part of the "club" of local exchange carriers subject to extensive state and federal regulation. A far more preferable approach
would be to take steps to encourage competitive
entry, reducing the market power of LECs and
permitting LECs to evolve into members of a competitive market, rather than agents of government
regulation and subsidy.
The reforms required must take cognizance of
the different legal "bargains" struck between business and government in the wireline and broadband CMRS industries. 20 ILECs long ago entered
into a very extensive bargain-a regulatory contract-with government: universal service obligations and regulation of prices and investment decisions in exchange for a protected monopoly and
a guaranteed return. The modern approach to
competition continues to subsidize these carriers
but purports to invite "competition" by making
the subsidies explicit and portable to carriers who
win customers away from the ILEC. 21 Of course,
in order to receive such subsidies, the competing
carrier must also assume the terms and conditions

of the LEC's regulatory contract and adapt their
business approach to one much closer to the business model of the regulated wireline LEC.
True, the FCC has wisely not required a CMRS
carrier to assume LEC status or to be regulated as
a LEC to obtain universal service subsidies. 22 But
even so, subsidies are subject to changing political
fortunes, create uncertainty, require additional
lobbying efforts to preserve and come with too
many unknown "strings" attached to make them a
viable basis for making business decisions in a
competitive market. 23 Accordingly, policymakers
should not subject CMRS carriers to regulations
designed for the LEC model, nor should it be surprising that CMRS carriers are, for the most part,
uninterested in obtaining additional revenue
through government subsidies.
Building on the assumptions that competitive
markets are sought, here are some prospective
suggestions for revisions to current telecommunications policy: First, inter-carrier taxation and
subsidy must end. To the extent that subsidies are
needed where a cost-oriented price for local service connections is unaffordable, those subsidies
should be collected from the general tax base and

20
Id. The concept of legislation or regulation as a bargained-for contract is common in the academic literature.
See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G.TULLOCK,THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1966); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971);Joseph P. Kalt &
Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 Am. ECON. REV. 279 (1984). See alsoJonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1986) (discussing the role of the judiciary in enforcing legislative bargains). Under the "public choice" theory developed
by Buchanan, Stigler and others, law and regulation is developed in response to competitive rent-seeking between interest groups, rather than a disinterested and comprehensive
view of the public interest. FCC staff, for example, chose the
word "treaty" to refer to the jurisdictional separations rules
and pointed out that the 'treaty' "carefully balances a
number of conflicting social objectives and competing interests." FCC ACCESS REFORM TASK FORCE, FEDERAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCESS CHARGE REFORM: A STAFF ANALYSIS (Apr. 30,
1993) at 63.
21
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §254(e) (limiting subsidies to eligible carriers); 47 U.S.C. §214(e) (statutory eligibility criteria);
May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 8933, paras.
286-87 (specifying eligibility criteria and explaining how subsidies are portable among eligible carriers).
22
See May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
8852, para. 135, 8859, para. 147.
23 Controversy over the status and viability of the universal service programs, particularly the e-rate programs
designed to reimburse carriers who provide discounted services, to certain schools, libraries and health care providers,
continues to shed doubt on whether and to what extent fund-

ing will be available under these programs. See, e.g., Beth S.
Noveck, Universal Service in the United States: unjust, unreasonable, and unaffordable?, I IrT. j. COMM. L. & POL. (visited Dec.
16, 1998) <www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/I1998/ijclp_webdoc_
15 1 1998.html>. Despite the inauguration of the schools
and libraries program in the Spring of 1997, schools are only
now beginning to learn whether or not they qualify for discounted telecommunications services. See First E-Rate Funds
Sent to Schools and Libraries, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 24, 1998.- The

extent to which schools will receive expected funding for internal Internet connections, one of the most touted aspects
of the program, remains uncertain. See Court Hears Complex
Challenge to FCC Universal Service Order, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 2,

1998. For this reason, advocates of the e-rate program have
argued that proposals to fund equipment and services for
schools and libraries directly through tax receipts and block
grants should be opposed because it would "yank the E-Rate
out from under the protective rubric of Universal Service
and throw it into the normal appropriations process, where it
will be subject to the usual horse-trading." Nicholas Confessore, Boon or Boondoggle, SALON (visited Dec. 16, 1998) <www.
salonmagazine.com/21 st/feature/1998/12/16feature.html>.
The costs to businesses of politically motivated changes in
government largesse are, however, beginning to be recognized by the courts, leading to further controversy. Cf
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 116 S. Ct. 2432,
135 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1996) (United States government, as a
contracting party, could not exercise its sovereign powers to
alter, modify, obstruct or violate a contract into which it had
entered with a private party); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v.
United States, 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying Winstar to government's breach of an agreement to aid electric
utility cost recovery).
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distributed directly to the consumers to the extent
possible. Telecommunications may be as essential
for economic growth as food is for human growth,
but we have seen fit to subsidize farmers through
general tax appropriations administered through
the Department of Agriculture. We support individuals through food stamps and other programs.
But we do not require restaurants to collect a portion of your dinner bill and forward it on to the
government for re-distribution to grocery' stores.
We do not require a sushi bar to support lower
prices at Burger King simply because more Americans have traditionally preferred hamburgers.
Neither should we perpetuate such systems for
telecommunications services.

Second, policymakers should not subject broadband CMRS carriers to regulations that are a vestige of the traditional wireline model. Policymakers may believe that "competitive neutrality"
requires imposing equal regulatory burdens on all
potential competitors-a least-common-denominator approach to deregulation. For example, in
order to avoid "asymmetric competition," regulators may believe it necessary to extend the public
service obligations of the LECs' regulatory bargain to all potential competitors. Given the vast
differences in market power, as well as differences
in the "regulatory bargain," it is hardly neutral to
expand any of the extensive local exchange carrier regulations to wireless carriers who were
never before subject to such regulation. 24 Ironically, the burden of such regulation may fall disproportionately on rural CMRS carriers, harming
the very universal service objectives such an approach may be intended to advance. 25
Finally, policymakers should become more
comfortable with allowing market demand, i.e.,
consumers, to drive decisions regarding both pric24

Whether it was fair to break the LECs "bargain", by

opening the market to competition is again a subject for
some other author. One interesting treatment of the subject
can be found inJ. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract,71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 851 (1996). But see Oliver E. Williamson, Response Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Pre-

cautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1007 (1996).
25
See, e.g.,
In re Forbearance from Applying Provisions of
the Communications Act to Wireless Telecommunications
Carriers, Comments and Petition for Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking of the Rural Telecomm. Group, WT Dkt. No. 98-100,
9-10 (Aug. 3, 1998) ("the cost of government regulation of
CMRS carriers falls more heavily on rural wireless providers
• . .[who] have neither the economies of scope to absorb
such FCC-imposed costs nor a large subscriber base over

ing and infrastructure investment. One of the
characteristics of telecommunications regulation
presently applied to ILECs is that decisions about
investment in new technologies and facilities are
dependent on whether the costs will fit into a
business model supported by subsidies. Hesitancy
about whether the government will allow the costs
of investment to be recovered has been partially
responsible for a slow rate of innovation among
regulated companies; at the same time, government interests in mandating particular service capabilities arealso a continuing feature of wireline
local service regulation. The competitive market
model as followed by CMRS carriers does not rely
on subsidies; investment decisions follow market
demand. In fact, the wireless market is a useful
model for policymakers to rely on as they measure
revolutionary progress toward a competitive local
services market.
C.

The Wireless Market as Regulatory Utopia

For wireless telecommunications businesses,
competition is hardly novel. Historically, government licenses for cellular spectrum were structured to create competing facilities-based carriers
in every market; the industry has long been recognized as competitive. 26 By 1993, Congress had
recognized and codified principles stating that
the wireline model of state-by-state regulation of
entry, construction, rates, earnings and investment was utterly inappropriate for wireless businesses. 27 With the introduction of still more competitors in 1995, market forces now dominate the
operation of the wireless market. As documented
in the FCC's annual reports, such market forces
resulted in the introduction of innovative pricing
plans, reductions in rates and further investments
which to spread the cost of compliance").
26 See, e.g., Stanford Levin, Measuring Competition for IntraLATA Services, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT, Third Biennial Telecomm. Conf. sponsored by
Nat'l Econ. Research Ass'n, at 57 (Apr. 12-15, 1989) (Lewis

Perl, NERA, ed.) (citing cellular as an example of effective
competition) .
27 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
§6002(b), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 392 (codified in
various sections of 47 U.S.C. §332 (1994)). See also Leonard
J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal Regulatory Framework That Is 'Hog
Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong,' 50 FED. COMM. LJ. 547
(1998) (explaining how Congress amended the Communications Act to prohibit state-by-state regulation of wireless serv-

ices).
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in technology, particularly digital networks. 28
The story of the wireless industry is one of rapidly increasing penetration and universal availability of wireless service, even in rural areas, all
achieved without government subsidies or government-directed rate design. According to the
FCC's Third Annual CMRS Competition Report, the
mobile telephone industry had 55 million subscribers in 1998, an increase of 25 percent from
the previous year; subscribership is now over 60
million. 29 Market penetration was over 20 percent of the nation's population, 30 and 38 percent
of American households, with an additional six
percent of households indicating an intention to
acquire a mobile telephone by early 1999. 3 1 De-

mand is sufficient to support numerous wireless
providers in approximately 273 markets, covering
over 219 million people; representing over 87 percent of the national population. 32 Broadband
CMRS services, as well as other advanced services,
are available in rural areas, although rural CMRS
providers generally receive no subsidies for those
services and rely simply on market demand to
33
produce sufficient revenue.
Market forces also operated to weed out market
players whose business plans were either poorly
prepared or not heeded in the C block PCS auctions. Just as the FCC appropriately was reluctant
to intervene to "prop up" "C" block PCS bidders
who miscalculated, policymakers should continue
to not intervene in market-based decision-making
regarding investments, pricing and services of
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broadband CMRS carriers. 3 4 Instead, policymakers should be seeking to preserve market-based
decision making for wireless companies and to expand the presence of market-based decision making to wireline telephone companies.
Despite the usual public rhetoric, competitive
markets are, not a regulatory utopia in the minds
of everyone. The reasons for government intervention in competitive markets may vary: as discussed above, competition means that regulators
must trust markets to yield value for consumers,
an arrangement that may feel to them like an "abdication" of responsibility. Additionally, change
in the law often moves at a pace that seems glacial
when compared to the rapid time-frames of competitive business decision-making. The law places
great weight on precedent, and a competitive local exchange market is a 180-degree reversal from
the direction contemplated by history. To remove the disincentives of a subsidy-based local exchange market and a 19th century model for local
telephone regulation, the primary steps must be
to understand the historical foundations and to
develop political consensus in a new direction.
D.

So Who Wants A Revolution?

The present moment is ripe for a policy revolution if we really want one. As Crane Brinton (and
more recently George Schmitt) recognized, revolutions occur because the populace becomes dissatisfied with the absence of "common sense' in

28 See generally In re Implementation of Section 6002(b)
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with
Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, First Report, 10 FCC
Rcd. 8844 (1995) [hereinafter First Competition Report]; Second
Competition Report, 12 FCC Rcd. 11,266; Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 19,746.
29
Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at 19,750 (citing

Thomas J. Lee & Andrew E.Govers, Mobile Outlook-Summer
1998, Salomon Smith Barney Equity Research, June 8, 1998
(reporting that 50 percent of the population is served by at
least five or six mobile telephone competitors).
33
See, e.g.,
Comments of the Rural Telecommunications
Group, In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accel-

Appendix B, Table 1, at B-2). CTIA reports are published at

erate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Tele-

<www.wow-com.com>. Subscriber growth has repeatedly out-

communications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. No. 98-146, at 21

paced estimates. For example, in 1994, the Personal Com-

(Sept. 14, 1998) (stating that "[r]ural telecommunications
companies are deploying advanced services to rural areas").

munications Industry Association ("PCIA") estimated that total 1998 subscriptions for cellular, PCS and SMR/ESMR
services would reach 46.9 million. That figure had already
been exceeded by December 1997, the time of the figures
shown in the Third Competition Report. Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 19,746, at Appendix B-2.
30
Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at 19,750. A Yan-

kee Group study indicates that penetration will likely increase to 25 percent by the end of 1998. See PCIA, 1998
20.
PCIA, 1998 WIRELESS MARKET MONITOR 51.
32
Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at 19,750, Appendix H, Map H-i (showing U.S. cellular coverage). See also
WIRELESS MARKET PORTFOLIO YANKEE GROUP STUDY

31

In addition to broadband CMRS, the Rural Telecommunications Group notes that rural providers are also offering such

advanced wireless services as Local Multipoint Distribution
Service ("LMDS") and low mobility local service over CMRS
spectrum. Id. at iv, 2, 12.
34
See, e.g., In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules
Regarding Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Service (PCS) Licensees, Order on Reconsideration

of the Second Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 8345 (1998) (statement of Commissioner Susan Ness concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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government. 35 And ever since the FCC elected to
allow competition in telecommunications with its
Above 890 decision in 1960, there has been a necessary period of transition from a fully regulated
monopoly telephone industry to a robustly competitive telecommunications industry. Because of
the irreconcilable nature of these two
frameworks, the transition has been-perhaps out
of political necessity-fertile ground for equivocation, doublespeak and nonsense. But, in large
part because of the American traditions of free
speech and open government, common sense
tends to force change eventually.
However, the revolution that will create a totally
"pro-competitive, deregulatory" telecommunications environment has not yet occurred. The
1996 Telecommunications Act was merely a set of
amendments to an existing telecommunications
law framework that is, admittedly, nearing the official retirement age of sixty-five. It is ironic that
while calling center stage for competition, the
legal and regulatory framework for competition
in basic residential and small business telephone
service is still largely premised on the traditional
regulatory contract for the regulated monopoly: a
model of regulated providers exchanging public
obligations in return for subsidies.
Some may have said that they wanted a telecommunications "revolution," but the 1996 Act was
merely a transitional figure in any such revolution. The present state of affairs-a tenuous netherworld somewhere between the traditional
model of regulation and internal cross-subsidycannot be the basis of a permanent arrangement
any more than Alexander Kerensky in 1917 or
Shapour Bakhtiar in the Iranian Revolution of
1979 were politically positioned for long-term
leadership.
35 See George F. Schmitt, The Information Revolution and
the Regulatory Old Regime, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN a Competitive Environment, Third Biennial Telecomm. Conf., sponsored by Nat'l Econ. Research Ass'n, at 213 (Apr. 12-15,
1989) (Lewis Perl, NERA, ed.); CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1965).
36
Around the time of the Iranian Revolution, the U.S.
Congress enacted revolutionary legislation deregulating the
airline industry. Unlike the Telecommunications Act of
1996, that legislation disbanded price and entry regulation
entirely and can more accurately be said to have adopted a
"deregulatory, pro-competitive" national framework. See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §334 et seq. (1978)), sections later

repealed, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1367 (1994).
37 141 Cong. Rec. 93 (Daily Ed., June 08, 1995) (state-

One important reason for the 1996 Act's tepid
reforms is that policymakers appear to have a certain degree of discomfort for what competition
entails, as well as whether it will be welcomed by
consumers. This is a far different political situation than when, for example, competition was introduced to the long-distance industry or when
the airline industry was deregulated. 36 The pri-

mary issues appear to be concern for "universal
service," a system subsidizing low wireline local
service prices, particularly in rural areas, and a
general consumer backlash should local telephone prices increase.
During the debates leading up to the 1996 Act,
Senator Kerrey of Nebraska presciently pointed
out that there was extensive support for policy revisions from industry, but no discernible mandate
for change from the population at large. Senator
Kerrey cautioned his colleagues that,
it took seven or eight years [after the AT&T divestiture]
before the consumers gave you a round of applause.

There was a long period of time after 1984 when people, at least in my State, were saying what in the Lord's
name is going on here? All of a sudden I cannot get a
phone into my house; I have to go to a different provider; I have 37competition; I have choice. What the heck
is going on?

So now, even apart from the perceived competitive threat to universal service, there are statements from influential policymakers about how
competition must be "managed," either to ensure
"neutrality" or to protect the public from the
harms of competition.3 8 Others may be thoughtfully struggling with these issues or they may simply be caught between politically opposing factions. In any event, their public statements
demonstrate that they are not yet fully comfortable with unequivocal support for competition in
telecommunications and all that it entails.

39

ment of Sen. Kerrey).
38
See, e.g., Action in Docket Case-Common Carrier Action; Joint Board Makes Universal Service Recommendations
to FCC, Provides Guidance on Issues Concerning Support for
Non-Rural Carriers That Serve High Cost Areas, CC Dkt. No.
96-45, at 16 (separate statement of Public Counsel Martha
Hogerty) (Nov. 23, 1998) (noting that the universal service
provisions of the 1996 Act were not designed to promote
competition but rather to protect from competition's effects).
39

Compare William E. Kennard, A Broad(band) Vision for

America, Remarks to Federal Communications Bar Association, June 24, 1998 ("competition always beats regulation as

the way to bring consumers more services, better quality and
the lowest prices"); with Wireless Telecommunications Action-Commission Grants in Part and Denies in Part PCIA's
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Competitive markets do not need to be managed by regulators, but achieving a political consensus in favor of a fully deregulatory, pro-competitive telecommunications environment does.
Reluctance to challenge the accepted vision for
local telephony is not surprising given the political and economic interests of the parties involved. Where governments rig markets to provide for central government control, price
services and dictate investments to favor preferred
constituencies and condition consumers to a noncompetitive environment, howls are likely to
erupt at any sign of actual change. Lenny Bruce's
observation that the Soviet Union is like one giant
phone company continues to be a valid analogy as
both the former Soviet Union and the former Bell
System make a painful transition to a free-market
environment. In both cases, government and the
public must make painful choices, learn to deal
with new ways of doing things and, in the short
term anyway, face rising prices for formerly subsidized commodities.
In the end, it was the cognitive dissonance between the public propaganda and reality that
brought down the Soviet Union. It may well be
cognitive dissonance that spells the end of our
present policy for local telephone services. On
the other hand, a number of recent political
events make it clear that cognitive dissonance and
dissembling are fairly widespread and widely tolerated. Consequently, it is not enough to argue
what should be done on the basis of economic efficiency or other consumer benefits to be achieved.
Experience suggests that those arguments are not,
by themselves, a sufficient basis for revolutionary
change. The revolution must be one in which
political forces reach a point where the breakdown of the traditional wireline subsidy arrangements is imminent, where frustration with the
lack of competition reaches its peak and where a
comfort level regarding local pricing and service
in rural areas is sufficient to permit full commitment to a "pro-competitive, deregulatory" approach.

E.

Petition for Forbearance; Solicits Comment on Further Forbearance, WT Dkt. No. 98-100, GN Dkt. No. 94-33, at 7 (June
23, 1998) (separate statement of Chairman William E. Kennard) ("it would be an abdication of our responsibility to
consumers to rely simply on the workings of the market to

ensure that America's consumers receive quality service at
fair and reasonable prices").
40
See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Technology and Regulatory
Thinking: Albert Einstein's Warning, Remarks before the Legg
Mason Investor Workshop, Washington, D.C., Mar. 13, 1998.

The Revolution Must Be Televised

Accordingly, this article not only identifies legal
and policy dissonance, but attempts to identify
where political compromises might be found that
would facilitate a more rapid transition to a fully
deregulatory, pro-competitive pricing environment for telecommunications services. Contrary
to the assessments of a different revolution in a
different time, this revolution must be televised.
Indeed, the revolutionary message should improve substantially on the usual tone and content
of television by being honest and objective about
what is involved in embracing full competition for
telecommunications, something at which both industry and policymakers have fallen short. If competition and its aspects are treated with more candor, the public is less likely to be let down or
concerned when reality does not measure up to
dishonest policy pronouncements. Perhaps candor is too much to expect for appointed commissioners and elected representatives, whose time
frames of reference may be too small to encompass the transition to competition. But there are
likely many policymakers both interested in having broadband CMRS carriers bring competitive
pressure to local telephone service markets and
willing to build support for moving smartly towards deregulation.
Certain policymakers, notably FCC Commissioner Michael Powell, demonstrate in their pubtic remarks that they understand those things that
are right and true about a fully deregulatory, procompetitive 21st century model for telecommunications regulation. 40 As Commissioner Powell has
written:
One reason that policymakers find it difficult, even af-

ter setting appropriate ground rules, to allow the market to run its course is, ironically, their fear of ceding
control to the marketplace. The Act commands policymakers and industry to move away from the monopoly-

oriented, over-regulatory origins of communications
policy and toward a world in which the market, rather
than bureaucracy, determines how communications re-

sources should be utilized. Yet, so often, we cannot actually bring ourselves to let go-to jump off our regula-
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tory perch. It is true that risks await in free markets:
risk that consumers will be harmed by anticompetitive
conduct on the part of firms with market power; risk
that communications companies may be acquired,
downsized, or driven out of business; and risk that some
individuals will not vie successfully for the many choice
jobs that competition will create . . . Communications
leaders must not give in to these fears so lightly, 4but
1
instead must have the courage to trust the market.

So far, this is not a majority view. Few have the
true grit to handle the uncertainty that comes
with trusting a new frame of reference and the
political courage to stand on principles even if
they may prove unpopular. But the importance
of understanding that competitive businesses
need different principles than those used before
for local telephony should not be underestimated. The preservation and growth of the investment incentives that have so far sparked the
wireless revolution depend on that understanding.
There are, to be sure, some important nonpolitical issues that represent obstacles to the
evolution of broadband CMRS as a local substitute; I do not discuss those here in detail. For example, there-are technical obstacles to the growth
of broadband CMRS, such as the still-young
buildout of broadband PCS networks and issues
such as the relatively short battery life of some
mobile phones and the suitability of wireless signals for data transmissions and other wireline
uses. These issues are important but perhaps better left .to more technology-oriented authors,
Policymakers and regulators can help fulfill a public interest role by adapting policies to these
forces of technological change and moving away
from the 19th century model for local telephony
that still dominates much of our law and our policy approaches to that service market.
II.

THEODORE VAIL'S REGULATION
REVOLUTION: THE PUBLIC SWITCHED
TELEPHONE NETWORK AND THE
"PUBLIC UTILITY' BARGAIN

In this section, I recap the origins and outlines
of the ILEC model for the provision of local telephone service. Perhaps the most descriptive feature of this model is the concept of the "public
switched telephone network" ("PSTN"). One
41
Michael K. Powell, Communications Policy Leadershipfor
the Next Century, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 529, 534-35 (1998). 42
See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal

rarely refers to "the public grocery store network"
or the "public tax preparation services network";
goods and services are customarily exchanged between consumers and privately owned businesses.
Telephone networks, too, are privately owned, or
publicly held only in the sense that private ownership of equity is available to members of the public on stock exchanges. Telephone networks are
not "public property" in the same way as highways, streets and bridges. Yet the historical evolution of local telephone service has created an unusually close relationship between government
and business, and it is this relationship that continues to exist as the present model for local telephone service into which policymakers imagine
(incorrectly) that broadband CMRS carriers may
evolve.
Telecommunications technology developments
in the last thirty years have created something relatively novel: a network of networks, all privately
owned, interconnected on the basis of commercial negotiations, providing service to the same
general geographic areas as the incumbent local
telephone utility. New companies are, as we
speak, constructing competitive access networks,
fiber rings, wireless networks and even packetswitched networks to carry local voice, data and
even video traffic. True, the evolution of telephone service saw the creation of over 1,000 local
exchange carriers who were (and are)'legally and
financially "independent" from the Bell System
(or more recently, the Bell Operating Companies).. But those firms operated in areas the Bell
System chose not to serve and, for the last 100
years, those companies have been treated in many
respects not as private competitors, but as cooperating elements of the PSTN.
The term PSTN is a bit of a misnomer; its
strange character is an apt symbol for the curious
nature of contemporary telecommunications policy. Although (unlike, until recently, telephone
networks in the rest of the world) the U.S. telephone networks are not publicly owned, government regulation and antitrust consent decrees ensured that the local telephone network operated
very much as if they were public property and as if
it were a single network. The term PSTN persists
in telecommunications policy today.4 2 The public
Service, AMSC Subsidiary Corporation Request for Waiver,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 22,426, para. 16

.(1998) (noting that AMSC benefits from universal service re-
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character of a privately owned network is conceptually related to the term "affected with the. public
interest," which early on established an antitrust
law rationale for regulation of facilities deemed
economically essential. 43 By virtue of the monopoly granted to wireline LECs, government became
involved in the rates charged and the investments
made on the public's behalf. Hence, the term
"public switched telephone network" came to be
used to refer to an entity which is in fact neither
public nor a singular network.
The curious relationship of. private investment
and "public utilities" has its origins in the nature
of the bargain struck between the investors in telephone networks and the government. As we
shall see, the terms and conditions of this bargain
differ substantially as between wireline LECs and
broadband CMRS carriers, reflecting different expectations about how business would be conducted and service provided. It is because of
these differences that the regulatory framework
for one type of carrier cannot easily be imposed
on another, and because of these differences that
broadband CMRS carriers are not likely to assume
the universal service obligations of wireline LECs
or otherwise structure their businesses along the
lines of the wireline LEC business.

tion. 44 As Greg Sidak and Prof. Daniel Spulber
have explained, the regulatory "contract" was
born roughly 180 years ago. At the time, city governments lacked the capital needed to fully exploit new technologies and therefore offered
franchises or charters to private entrepreneurs to
build utilities and railroads. 45 As utilities began to
grow horizontally, often to take advantage of
economies of scale, the existence of multiple municipal or local franchises became burdensome,
and state public utility commissions were created
46
for regulatory and pricing matters.

Regulation of public utilities in general represents an agreement between the owners and investors of the utility and the government, as agent
for the general population. The economic and
political foundations of this contract stretch far
back in the common law and history of regula-

The terms of the regulatory contract were generally those same provisions now widely understood and codified in state statutes and the Communications Act. In the earliest franchises, the
city granted access to rights-of-way, while the entrepreneurs accepted the obligation to serve the
public on a nondiscriminatory basis at reasonable
rates. A city or state commission would also control entry of the potential competitors, regulate
rates to ensure that return on investment was sufficient to attract capital and enforce obligations to
serve all customers in a given franchise area regardless of cost.
In return, this contractual arrangement also
served to address concerns on the part of the utility investors based on the economic nature of telecommunications networks and other utilities.
Utilities must incur enormous up-front costs in order to offer service, and must do this before they
earn a single dollar of revenue. In so doing, the
utility runs the risk not only that demand will not
materialize as projected, but, as a regulated utility,
it also confronts the risk of confiscation by government action. 47 Rate regulation therefore

quirements from its "use of the PSTN").

Tracts 45, 78 (Dublin 1787). A useful discussion of these

A. The "Public Utility Bargain"

43

See generally, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).

The foundational concepts of utility regulation as a
contractual relationship or bargain go back as far as the 19th
century to some of the foundational cases of public utility
44

foundations is George Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation
and the 'Theories of Regulation' Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289

(1993).
45

Sidak & Spulber, supra note 24, at 898. See also ELI W.
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 72-74 (1950);

and common carrier regulation. In 1837, the U.S. Supreme

CLEMENS,

Court recognized that the Massachusetts legislature had entered into a contract with the proprietors of the Charles
River Bridge (although not one which implied exclusivity
with respect to such bridges). Charles River Bridge v.. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). The special common carrier obligations of public utilities stem from the Court's decision in
Munn, where the Court looked to the common law for the
principle that private property "affected with the public interest" ceases to be juris privationly and thus requires a bargain
between the state and the property owner to govern the
property's use by the public. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126, citing
Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, 1 Hargrave Law

HERBERT

B.

DoRAu,

MATERIALS FOR THE

STUDY OF PUBLIC

2-8, 12-22, 31-49 (1930);JoSEPH ASBURY
JOYCE, A TREATISE ON FRANCHISES 542-54 (1909).
46 Sidak & Spulber, supra note 24, at 906.
"
47 See id. at 885. These risks are often acute in the international context where constitutional protections against
such confiscation are not as strong or as vigorously enforced
as in the United States See, e.g., Martin Domke, Foreign NaUTILITY ECONOMICS

tionalizations:Some Aspects of Contemporary InternationalLaw, 55

AM.J.

INT'L

L. 585 (1961); M.

GORDON, THE CUBAN NATION-

ALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY

231 (1976).
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serves not only to protect the public from abuses
of monopoly power, but also to ensure that the
states' responsibility to ensure an adequate return
is met.48 For regulated utilities, the traditional
process is relatively straightforward, although new
"incentive regulation" processes have been devel-

oped. These and other aspects of the regulatory
contract are discussed below in the context of the
telephone industry.
B.

The "Public" Switched Telephone Network

The literature on the historical development of
the telephone network as a specific example is
both extensive and deep, and I have no desire to
re-tell the entire saga here. 49 The highlights that
bear on our current examination are as follows:
by 1894, Alexander Graham Bell's patents had expired and a number of local telephone companies
arose. These phone companies did not necessarily, however, connect their networks to each
other, nor were they necessarily connected to the
Bell System's "Long Lines" network that permitted inter-city calling. In fact, the Bell System pursued a systematic policy of denying interconnection to these facilities and leveraging that
situation to its advantage, buying up a substantial
number of the independent operators. This, unsurprisingly, attracted the attention of antitrust
enforcers emboldened by the passage of the Sher50
man Act only a decade before.

The resulting settlement, known as the "Kings48 See, e.g., FederalPower Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944) (requiring regulatory commissions to
balance consumer and investor interests in setting rates);.
Bluefield Waterworks and Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
W Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (rate of return should be comparable to investments in other business undertakings which
are attended by corresponding risks); In re PermianBasin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (regulatory commission has
discretion as to rate-setting method provided the end result is
within a "zone of reasonableness").
49 Some historical treatments of the rise of the Bell System are detailed in MILTON MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE:
COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM (1996); Warren Lavey, The Public Policies That Changed the Telephone Industry Into
Regulated Monopolies: Lessons FromAround 1915, 39 FED. COMM.
L.J. 171; Adam Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments
in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 2
(1994).
50
26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1-11.
51
Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury, AT&T, to James C.
McReynolds, Attorney General, Dec. 19, 1913; United States v.
AT&T, No. 6082 (D. Or. 1914) (Consent Decree). Ironically, the settlement freed the Bell System in part because it

bury Commitment," required the Bell System
(known by now as AT&T) to cease acquiring independent companies and to provide interconnection to the Long Lines network. But its effect
did not last long.5 1 Intervening events, particularly the first World War and the Great Depression, would make the horizontal integration of a
nationwide phone network an accepted public
policy arrangement. The premise for excluding
competition was largely the product of an astute
businessman, Theodore Vail, who convinced regulators and antitrust authorities that a fully integrated telephone network, subject to state and
federal regulation, would more likely yield public
benefit than competing networks and the attendant "wasteful duplication." From Vail's perspective, regulatory protection would establish the
Bell System as a monopolist while avoiding the
52
uncertainties of antitrust enforcement.
From the perspective of public authorities, a
single telephone system could more easily be held
accountable to public purposes and more easily
policed-as Caligula had once wished Rome had
but one neck. Moreover, a regulated monopolist
could more easily be required to set prices in a
manner desired by the government and invest in
facilities at directed locations. Thus, the policy of
excluding competition became synonymous with
the term "universal service," a term which continues to be the subject of much discussion. 5 3 Finally, the elimination of competing networks
must have been a boon for consumers, who were
proved too difficult to enforce in light of the economic efficiencies gained by horizontal integration of in-dependents
with the Bell System. In 1921, legislation gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission permission to exempt AT&T from
the antitrust laws for the purpose of acquiring competing
companies. Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921).
52

See generally PETER TEMIN & Louis

OF THE BELL SYSTEM
53 Although the

GALAMBOS, THE FALL

16 (1987).

term "universal service" was apparently
coined by Vail, and a general policy direction was included in
the 1934 Act, see 47 U.S.C. §151, legislative direction as to
what the term meant was not attempted until the 1996 Act.
See 47 U.S.C. §254. In the interim, the term was given a
number of meanings and used for a variety of purposes, not
all of them consistent with each other. Vail intended the
term to mean that service would be made "universal" by the
creation of a single interconnected network. Much later, the
separations process created as a result of Smith v. Illinois Bell
would yield a concept of "universal service" based on intentional cross-subsidies from interstate toll service to local exchange service. See supra note 5; Illinois Bell, 282 U.S. at 148
(holding that the price of both local and interstate service
must be calculated on a jurisdictionally separate measure of
costs).
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likely frustrated by the inability to reach parties
on other networks and the need for multiple telephones at a single location, not to mention the
disruption caused by multiple poles, wires and
other equipment.
The Communications Act of 1934 solidified the
horizontally integrated arrangement and placed
federal telecommunications policy in the hands of
a new entity, the FCC.54 FCC regulation of intrastate local exchange service was restricted, however; that area of policy was left in the hands of
the various state commissions. 55 The Bell System
worked quite well: telephone service became progressively cheaper, more available and more automatic. Quality continued to improve and Bell
Labs produced a number of innovations, despite
the absence of competitive pressures. 56 Independent telephone companies functioned as
informal (but at times uneasy) partners in the
Bell System and were similarly structured as regulated monopolists, protected from competition in
exchange for fulfilling public service obligations.
But change was literally in the air, in the form of
microwave radio transmissions.
C. A Revolutionary Spark: The FCC Opens the
Pandora's Box of Competition with the
Above 890 Decision
Competitive pressures started both from an inevitable economic development and from conscious FCC policy. After World War II, some
larger local telephone customers wished to set up
their own private network systems. These systems
would be interconnected with, but not owned by,
the local Bell carrier. Because the Bell system was
restricted by regulation in its pricing flexibility
and utilized a wide variety of internal cross-subsidies to keep basic residential prices low, larger
users stood to get a price break by constructing
their own networks for communications, for example, between different branch offices. This was
particularly true for inter-city communications,
because the separations process and other factors
required Bell to subsidize local service with revenues from long-distance calling and to maintain
54

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064,

73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§151 et seq. (1937).
55
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §152(b).
56
TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 52, at 19.
57
See, e.g., id. at 24-27.
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nationwide averaging in prices. 57
The FCC might not have allowed these private
networks, particularly private networks offered by
competitive carriers, to develop were it not for a
number of political factors. For example, among
the larger telephone customers who wished to
build private networks were television broadcasters. Broadcasters were heavy users of point-topoint telecommunications services, in part because they needed high-capacity channels to send
television signals back and forth before their final
transmission to the transmitting tower. The FCC
licenses and regulates television broadcasters, and
it was particularly interested in promoting their
growth in the post-WWII years. Giving these
broadcasters a chance to reduce their telecommunications costs was a strong motivator. Additionally, the FCC was interested in promoting a microwave relay system developed by Motorola, in part
due to some aggressive lobbying by Motorola itself. 58
It is here that the long shadows of the present
debate concerning competition begin. In the decision authorizing these private networks-named
the Above 890 decision for the microwave frequencies at issue-the monopoly wall was first
breached and the FCC's struggle to reconcile fundamentally inconsistent policy positions began.
The FCC began to adopt policies explicitly intended to foster competition, both in telecommunications and manufacturing. Among other
things, the FCC argued that "one size does not fit
all" telecommunications consumers and that its
decision would promote the public welfare by ex59
panding consumer choice.
The Bell System argued, to no avail, that this
decision would encourage "cream skimming," taking away business from Bell by serving only the
low-cost, high-demand customers and undermining the system of cross-subsidies and nationwide
averaging. The FCC denied that it was retreating
from any of the policies in favor of such arrangements or making broad decisions about competition. In fact, the FCC only dug itself farther into
this hole by declining to approve the Bell System's
competitive response to the private microwave sys53 See generally id. at 28-31. At the time, Western Electric-a Bell subsidiary-was more or less the sole manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.
59
In reAllocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890

mc/s, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359, 403-13 (1959), recon.

denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960) [hereinafter Above 890].
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tems' services based on its departure from accepted regulatory pricing practices.60 The regulatory schizophrenia in favor of both competition
on one hand and regulation (including universal
service, rate averaging and local telephone subsidies) on the other would at one stage result in the
divestiture of the Bell System's local operating
companies. The schizophrenia continues to this
day.
D.

Incentive Regulation, Investment Mandates
and "Universal Service"

"Incentive regulation" is a particularly interesting example of this policy schizophrenia. The
subject is indeed complex and Was the subject of
many lengthy proceedings at both the state and
federal level. 6 1 For our purposes, the important

element to remember is that incentive regulation
was designed to give ILECs the same efficiency incentives as those faced by businesses in a competitive market, while at the same time maintaining a
regulated price and service arrangement. Incentive regulation has, for the most part, only been
acceptable for the largest ILECs. Because of their
small rate base, smaller LECs are subject to larger
swings in costs and are simply unable to produce
the kind of efficiency gains needed to maintain
profitability. The point of this discussion is to
show how government control over LEC investment decisions differs substantially from the competitive market framework used by broadband
CMRS carriers.
Under traditional "cost-plus" or "rate-of-return"
60
See, e.g., In re Investigation of TELPAK Tariff, Order,
(Sept. 7, 1961); Tentative Decision, 38 F.C.C. 370, 373 (1964).
AT&T's attempts to respond to competition with comparable
offerings would similarly attract the attention of antitrust authorities.

61

The federal proceeding progressed over a number of

years, beginning first with AT&T and then expanding to include the largest LECs, specifically the BOCs and GTE. See
generally, In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd. 5208
(1987) [hereinafter Policy Notice]; Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195 (1988); Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873
(1989); Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd.
2176 (1990); Parties in Price Cap Proceeding Requested To
File Draft Rules Implementing Proposed Price Cap Plans,
Public Notice, 3 FCC Rcd. 262 (1988); In re Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Second Report and
Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6789 para. 22 (1990) [hereinafter
LEC Price Cap Order]; Erratum, 5 FCC Rcd. 7664 (1990), modified on recon., 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991) [hereinafter LEC Price

regulation, monopoly LECs operated under this
basic formula:
1) The regulator required the LEC to provide
services at a particular price to all customers, regardless of cost. Regulators could require particular facilities to be built and in fact required that
the LEC obtain prior approval before constructing any new facilities. 6 2 Prices were set based on
extrapolating from historical data to arrive at estimates of future costs and demand;
2) The LEC did so, incurred costs (including
the cost of raising investment capital) and recorded those costs under the accounting supervision of the regulator;
3) The LEC's decisions regarding cost expenditures were reviewed, often in highly contested
public hearings. On the approved investment,
the LEC was guaranteed, through a bargain with
the regulator, that it would earn a specified rate
of return. If demand estimates proved to be too
low to earn the expected "revenue requirement,"
the regulator permitted the carrier to increase
prices for the next year in order to make up the
difference.
LECs therefore could only increase their profits
by arguing with regulators about the magnitude
of their costs, including the "cost of capital," what
return on investment they should be allowed to
earn to encourage future investment. As is well
documented in the literature, they also had an incentive to over-invest in the facilities for traditional services and to operate inefficiently (not
unlike other centrally planned business enterprises).63 At the same time, regulations created a
Cap Reconsideration Order], affd sub nom., National Rural
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC,988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993). State regulatory commissions also examined incentive regulation for
the intrastate rates of the largest LECs in their states. See, e.g.,
LEC Price Cap Order, 5 FCC Rcd. at 6792, paras. 41-45. The
subject of incentive regulation also has been examined extensively in economic literature. See, e.g., Shane Greenstein et
al., The Effect of Incentive Regulation on Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Infrastructure, American Enterprise
Institute Telecommunications Summit, Conference Paper

(July 7, 1994).
62
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §214.
63
Harvey Avercb & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the
Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 53 Am. EcoN. REV. 1053
(1962); Stanislaw Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline
Companies: An Economic Analysis, 55 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).
A related problem is "gold-plating," where a firm includes
unproductive expense inputs in its revenue requirement calculations. See Brooks B. Albery & Mark P. Sievers, The AverchJohnson-Wellisz Model and the Telecommunications Industry, 40
FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 159 n.6 (1988); Harvey Leibenstein, Al-
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disincentive to invest in new or unproven technologies, because any benefits would be absorbed by
public obligations, while any risk of loss was likely
to be borne by the firm and its shareholders, and
if the new service generated substantial revenues,
any increase in their profit margins simply meant
refunds to consumers.
As one commentator has noted (apparently unconscious of the contradiction between "public"
and "private" networks), because the infrastructure is owned by private entities and the business
is not centrally directed, investment in the public
network is not automatic. 64 Incentive regulation
reasons that, just as market competition and consumer demand limit a competitive businesses'
prices, capping prices would require carriers to increase their profits not through increasing the
size of their regulated rate base but by providing
the required services more efficiently. To the extent that they did so, LECs would be allowed to
earn whatever rate of return they could.

Not surprisingly, incentive regulation was seen
as favorable by most of the larger LECs, who had a
significant amount of inefficiencies that could be
squeezed out relatively painlessly. Incentive regulation was vigorously opposed by many in Congress, labor unions and even some state regulators. The idea of allowing the regulated
incumbents to attain potentially limitless profit
margins was, to say the least, politically sensitive
for institutions highly accustomed to controlling
those profit margins. However, state regulators
came around to incentive regulation. One important element of this perspective was the decision
that incentive regulation would not preclude regulators from continuing to extract some of the
value of the LECs' possible profits for public purposes, including investment in advanced infrastructure. 65 Incentive regulation would still permit regulatory control over price and investment
decisions. It is in part the regulatory zeal for such
control that makes the prospect of LEC regula-

locative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 Am. ECON. REV. 392,
392-415 (1966). For example, unconfirmed rumors abound
in the industry that certain telephone companies went so far
as to purchase Rolls-Royce automobiles or even Lear jets for
service vehicles.
64
Harry M. Shooshan, Reforming Regulation of Local Exchange Carriers or It Is Broke, So Let's Fix It, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT, Third Biennial Telecommunications Conference (Apr. 1989) (Lewis Perl, NERA,
ed.), at 181.
65
For example, the FCC in 1997 elected to retain a consumer productivity dividend ("CPD") in the price cap plan.
The CPD was originally intended to allocate some of the benefits of the transition from rate of return to price caps directly to consumers in the form of reduced access charges, so
that LECs did not excessively benefit from past inefficiencies.
More explicitly, the Commission enacted a detailed policy
decision to force LEC rates down under price caps, perhaps
in part to blunt the criticisms from state commissions and
others that price caps would lead to excessive revenues for
the LECs. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Dominant Carriers, Further Notice, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195, 3263,
3408 (1988)
([W]e propose to insure [sic] that consumers benefit
from price cap regulation by extracting from carriers
real rate decreases that reasonably can be expected to
exceed those which would have resulted if rate-of-return
regulation were applied. . . [T]he half a percentage
point premium [the consumer productivity dividend]
that we are placing on the productivity factor ensures
that, on an ongoing basis, ratepayers will be better off
under price caps than they would have been under rateof-return regulation.").
The Commission's election to retain it four years later,
however, can only be explained as an additional redistributive mechanism, because it is unrelated to any economically
meaningful measure of inflation or other changes that would
affect the price cap indexes. Because any efficiency gains

due to the initial transition would already have been captured for ratepayers, the Commission's decision to retain the
CPD is simply to add extra pressure on rates not justified by
increased LEC productivity. As the Commission explains, the
CPD will continue to act as "a mechanism to ensure that
price cap LECs flow-through a reasonable portion of the benefits of productivity growth to ratepayers." In re Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Fourth Report
and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 16,642, 16,690, para. 123 (1997). See
In re Price Cap Performance Review, Fourth Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 13,664, 13,668 (1995); In re
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers,
FirstReport and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8961 (1995), aff'd sub. nom.
Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
But see Judges Question Validity of FCC's Price Cap Order,
TELECOMM. REP. DAILY, Jan. 20, 1999. On May 21, 1999, the

D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the FCC's decision to
continue the CPD -as well as the agency's choice of a productivity offset-for further explanation. See United States Tel.
Ass'n v. FCC, No. 97-1649 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 1999) <http://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199905.htm>.
This distributive aspect of incentive regulation is also present in state proceedings. For example, the FCC noted that
the network improvements or investments required by state
regulators have been developed as part of a negotiated agreement with the LEC in question. LEC Price Cap Order, 5 FCC
Rcd. at 6831, para. 363 n.500 ("for example, SWB in New
Mexico will develop a network connecting all of that state's
universities and community colleges; Pacific Bell in California will invest $404 million to digitize its network by 1992").
This practice continues today: in the most recent Colorado
incentive regulation plan, US WEST agreed to a new five-year
incentive regulation plan that would (1) cap residential and
business rates at current levels for five years; (2) reduce intrastate access charges by $12 million; (3) eliminate a planned
rate increase to cover the costs for expanding local calling
areas; (4) reduce intrastate toll rates by $12 million; (5) invest $40 million to improve services; (6) absorb up to $8 mil-
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tion of CMRS business decisions particularly unattractive. Operating in a competitive market,
CMRS carriers respond to consumers, not government, in making decisions to invest in advanced
infrastructure.
At the time that LEC incentive regulation was
being adopted, the U.S. government was acutely
concerned about a telecommunications infrastructure equivalent of the space race. 6 6 Japan
had announced significant investments in integrated services digital networks ("ISDN") and anticipated that it would have an ubiquitous broadband network connection in every home by the
year 2015. The United States had fallen behind a
number of European and Asian countries in deploying advanced technology. Policymakers responded with a flurry of activity, including some
astute legislative proposals that would start thenSenator Al Gore, Jr., down the road to prominence as a proponent of further investment in
broadband telecommunications and computer
technology.

67

Incentive regulation was seen as an important
element of this strategy, because it enabled firms
to undertake some of the investments that they
would not have in a rate-of-return environment.
Thus, the state regulators reluctantly introduced
an additional feature of the competitive market
into local telephony and gradually allowed the
ILECs themselves to start thinking like competitive businesses. But they did so only on the condition that they be permitted to retain the ability to
lion in local number portability costs; and (7) offer $22 million in credits to residential and business customers to offset
an anticipated 4.23 percent universal service fund charge. A

service quality assurance plan would require the carrier to
pay up to $15 million in annual penalties for failing to meet
certain service standards. See TELECOMM. REP. DAILY, Oct. 30,
1998.
66 LEC Price Cap Order, 5 FCC Rcd. at 6790, para. 28.
("We are aware of the extensive debate currently in progress
over the relative competitiveness of U.S. industries in comparison to those of Western Europe and the Far East."). See,
e.g.,
WJ. BAUMOL ET AL., PRODUCTnVI AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP: THE LONG VIEW (1989); Clemens P. Work, Wiring the
Global Village, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 26, 1990; Calvin
Sims, The Baby Bells Scramble for Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,

1989, at section 3, pg. 1; Steven Prokesch, Western Europe
Moves to Expand Free-TradeLinks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1989, at
Al; Jack Robertson, US Losing in Gear, Materials, ELEC. NEWS,
July 16, 1990, at 5.

Vice President (then Senator) Gore proved particularly astute when he recommended measures to increase research into expanding the Defense Department's ARPAnet
into a more robust network, contributing significantly to the
development of the Internet. See H.R. 2639, 103d Cong., 1st
67

dictate increased investment without regard to
whether a competitive market would provide an
effective return.
The prospect that competition will return investment decisions to the marketplace is perhaps
one of the reasons legislators and regulators are
reluctant to embrace a truly deregulatory approach to local telephony. Local competition
may result in greater investment, to the extent that
firms must make such investments in order to
compete with innovative competitors, and to provide new services in response to demand and to
the extent that a competitive market permits an
opportunity to earn higher returns. But competition may also not yield investment at the pace and
of the types desired by regulators as a matter of
social policy. 68 Moreover, when services are der-

egulated in response to competition, government
will lose some of its ability to direct investment in
what it sees as socially useful ways.
CMRS carriers operating in a competitive market make investments in advanced digital switching, intelligent network features and other items
based on a business case analysis showing that the
investment will yield a positive return. Of course,
even competitive businesses find room in the
budgets for charitable investments to schools and
the like. But investment decisions of the magnitude contemplated by regulators cannot simply be
mandated in the same way that they can in a monopoly environment where the firm's rate of re-

Sess. (1993) (proposing to appropriate funds for NIl pilot
projects); "National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Action, Administration Policy Statement," 58 Fed. Reg.
49,025 at 49,028-29 (1993). Vice President Gore also established a place in history by coining the term "information
highway," which was ubiquitous at the time, although as Rep.
Ed Markey noted, "[t]he good news from Washington is that

every single person in Congress supports the concept of an
information superhighway. The bad news is that no one has
any idea what that means." See Jonathan D. Blake & Lee J.
Tiedrich, The National Information InfrastructureInitiative and
the Emergence of the Electronic Superhighway, 46 Fed. Comm. LJ.
397 (June 1994) [hereinafter Nil Initiative]. The subject was

of such prominence that it was even given mention in President Clinton's first Inaugural Address. See William J. Clinton,
This Is Our Time, Let Us Embrace It, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1993,
at A26.
68 Social policy goals such as Internet access for schools
could, of course, be met in the traditional way through expenditures of general tax revenues, but these measures require Congressional consensus which may be more difficult

to achieve than an appeal-proof rulemaking decision by a
regulatory commission and less susceptible to control by the
Executive Branch. See HAUSMAN, supra note 15, at 2 n.7.
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turn is both regulated and guaranteed by state
and federal commissions.
The desire of regulators to "drive" industry in
particular directions is, ironically, one of the reasons for the more deregulatory approach adopted
for CMRS. This was certainly more or less true
when cellular telephony, newly auctioned personal communications services ("PCS") and new
enhanced specialized mobile radio services were
combined into a new deregulated category of
broadband CMRS. The historical accidents behind the development of CMRS may provide
some explanation for the difference between government's attitude toward competition in wireline
and wireless services.
III.

THE CELLULAR REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY OF BROADBAND CMRS

11.69

But mobile telephones were bulky and in-

convenient; among the inconveniences was the
limited number of channels available. The invention of "cellular" technology permitted channel
re-use: when a mobile handset left a given cell's
69
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Peter W. Huber et al.,
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coverage area, the signal would be "handed off" to
a new cell, thereby freeing up the channel at the
70
original cell site for use by another subscriber.
The invention of cellular technology permitted
much more extensive use of mobile telephones
and paved the way for wireless technologies that
are competitive economic substitutes for landline
telephony.
After many years of debate and delay, the FCC
elected to license cellular services in 1982, providing for two licenses per city with one allocated to
the incumbent local telephone company. The extensive delay was largely caused by the'FCC's inability (or refusal) to decide between direct aliocation of cellular spectrum only to local
telephone companies or a more open, competitive process with more than once license per market.7'

The use of radio technology for mobile telephone purposes extends back to Guglielmo Marconi's original concept: the use of mobile radio
transmitters and receivers on seagoing ships. Radio was in fact used in the 1920s for land telephone service by the Detroit police department
and evolved into a service interconnected with the
wireline telephone network during World War

II:

REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY,

ch. 4. See generally In re Allocation of Frequencies to the Various Classes of Non-Governmental Services in the Radio Spectrum from 10 Kilocycles to 30,000,000 Kilocycles, Report, 39
F.C.C. 68 (1945).
70
See, e.g., P. McGuigan et al., Cellular Mobile Radio Telecommunications: Regulating an Emerging Industy, 1983 B.Y.U.
L. RExv. 305, 309-11 (1983).
71
The economic costs of this delay have been estimated
to be perhaps $100 billion. HAUSMAN, supra note 15, at 22.
See alsoJeff Rohlfs et al., Estimate of the Loss to the United States
Caused by the FCC's Delay in Licensing Cellular Telecommunications, National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (1991);
FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 16, USING AucrIONS TO SELECT
FCC LICENSEES (authored by Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker)
(1985) (recommending improvements in the process of
awarding licenses).
72
These would also come to be known as radio common
carriers ("RCCs") or other common carriers ("OCCs"). In re
General Mobile Radio Service Allocation of Frequencies Between 25 and 30 Megacycles, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C. 1190,
1228 (1949).
. 73
In re Applications of ITT Mobile Telephone, Inc.,
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In 1949, the FCC first allocated separate

blocks of "land mobile" spectrum to wireline
72
LECs and to "miscellaneous" common carriers.
In 1963 and again in 1968, the FCC reaffirmed
this approach of separate licenses for wireline and
non-wireline licensees, 73 but it continued to face
arguments from the Bell System that private capital would be insufficient to fully develop the technology, and that without being able to leverage
the Bell System's existing assets and abilities, the
spectrum might lay idle.
The FCC agreed with this conclusion for a brief
time but then backed away, opting to continue its
dual licensing scheme of one wireline and one
non-wireline.7 4 This landmark decision forever
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 957,
963 (1964) [hereinafter 17-I Mobile Telephone]; In re Amend-

ment of Part 21 of the Commission's Rules With Respect to
the 150.8-162 mc/s Band to Allocate Presently Unassignable
Spectrum to the Domestic Public Land Mobile Radio Service
by Adjustment of Certain of the Band Edges, Report and Order,
12 F.C.C. 2d 841, recon. denied, 14 F.C.C. 2d 269, 271 (1968),
affd sub nom., Radio Relay Corp. v. FCC,409 F.2d 322 (2d Cir.

1969).
74

See In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the

Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, 46 F.C.C. 2d 752, 760 (1974)
(favoring allocation solely to wireline telephone companies);
In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency
Band 806-960 MHz, 51 F.C.C. 2d 945, 946, 953-54 (19,75)
(only one per market, but non-wirelines might also be eligible); In re An Inquiry Into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz &
870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Sys., 86 F.C.C. 2d
469, 478 (1981) (FCC to license two cellular licensees per
market, Block A (non-wireline) and Block B (wireline)). Cellular service was considered to be "exchange telecommunications services," and on this basis their provision by the BOCs
within LATA boundaries did not require special approval
under the 1982 antitrust consent decree. See United States v.
Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No. 82-0192, Misc. No. 82-0025
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separated the wireless business from its landline
counterpart and resulted in foundational differences between mobile wireless and wireline local
telephone service. Part of the basis for the FCC's
conclusion was that radio technology does not
lend itself to the argument that telecommunications is a natural monopoly in the same way that
wireline service does. Radio channels could be
utilized on an as-needed basis, while fixed wireline plant required much greater levels of upfront sunk costs. Competition was also the model
for broadcast radio. 75 Accordingly, the FCC began in 1949 with one of its first procompetitive
policies and competition has been the watchword
in mobile telephony ever since, with "salutary" results.

76

The wireless telephony roadmap, at least up to
this -point, has consistently pointed in the direction of competition and deregulation. When the
FCC elected to forbear from regulating prices
charged by cellular carriers, many states similarly
declined to do So. 7 7 Over time, different technical standards, business strategies and network arrangements arose, driven by competitive market
decisions. Regulation was, of course, necessary to
ensure reasonable and non-discriminatory inter-

connection with the ILEC, particularly for "nonwireline" cellular carriers who competed with the
78
ILEC's affiliated cellular carrier.
Congress preempted state regulation of cellular
prices, rates and entry in 1993 and gave the FCC
79
jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection.
This action was based in part on Congress's intent
"to establish a Federal regulatory framework to
govern the offering of all commercial mobile radio services."80 The Congressional goal was twofold: 1) to eliminate the jurisdictionally separate
framework imposed on landline companies
through section 2(b) of the Act and 2) to regulate
all commercial mobile radio services alike, including new PCS services, which were about to be auctioned. In order to rationalize the regulatory
framework and encourage higher levels of bidding, Congress essentially freed all broadband
CMRS services from the traditional rate and entry
burdens of intrastate local exchange regulation.'
Congress recognized that market conditions
might warrant different regulatory treatment of
CMRS as compared to other telecommunications
carriers, so it explicitly granted the FCC authority
to forbear from applying certain provisions of the
Act.

82

(PI), Memorandum, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1031 (D.D.C.
1983).
75 See G. CALHOUN, DIGITAL CELLULAR RADIO 35 (1988);

(c) (3) (A) (1995); see Federal

Communications Commission

Common

47

see

80 See 1993 OBRA Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
103-213, at 490.
81
For the new PCS carriers who acquired their licenses
through auctions and made substantial payments to the government in return, the regulatory "contract" between the
government and the carrier is arguably more explicit than
for cellular carriers and contains more easily quantifiable
damages in case of breach. For example, when the government advertises that licenses up for bidding will be subject to
particular regulatory conditions, one might make a plausible
claim for damages if the government changes the regulatory
conditions substantially after the auction price is paid. This
sort of "opportunism" is precisely what regulatory "bargains"
are supposed to preclude. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note24,
at 883. The use of auctions to award licenses has also
sparked debate concerning property rights. See, e.g., In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,791 (Aug. 19, 1998).
82. Section 332(c)(1)(A) provides that the Commission
may determine that any provision of Title II may be specified
as "inapplicable to [any] service or person" otherwise treated
as a common carrier. 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(1)(A). Congress enacted more expansive authority in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, permitting the FCC to forbear from applying any
regulation or any provision of the Act to any carrier or service. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. §151 et seq.).

REPORT OF THE BELL COMPANIES ON COMPETITION IN WIRE-

LESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (1991) (copy on file with
the author); HUBER, supra note 69, at section 4.2. The Geo-

desic Network's analysis of the economic differences may have
changed somewhat with changes in technology. Digital wireless services are able to accommodate a much larger number
of additional users on a given bandwidth, and new PCS networks may have more than ample extra capacity. Even so,
the general principle remains true: long-run average costs decline with increases in volume much more extensively for
wireline than for wireless.
76 See NYT Mobile Telephone, I Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 963.
77 See In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845
MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications System,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and FurtherOrder on Reconsideration, 90 F.C.C. 2d 571, 576-77 (1982); In re the Need to Promote Competition & Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio
Common Carrier Services, Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd.
2910 (1987); In re the Need to Promote Competition & Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 4

FCC Rcd. 2369 (1989).
78 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643,
651 (D.D.C. 1983) (BOCs required to offer all mobile carriers access to the landline network on equal terms).
79 See Conference Agreement on the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-213, at
490, reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. at 1088 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 OBRA Conference Report]; 47 U.S.C. §§332(c) (1) (B) and

Carrier

Service,

C.F.R.

§§51.701,

51.703,

51.709(b), 51.711(a), 51.715(d) and 51.717 (1998).
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As to the first goal, the Communications Act
provides in section 2(b) that "Except as provided
in .

.

. section 332 .

.

. nothing in this [Act] shall

be construed to apply or to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations
for or in connection with intrastate communica83
tion service by wire or radio of any carrier."
Congress determined that because mobile services operate "without regard to state lines," it
would be administratively burdensome and unproductive to separate CMRS into interstate and
intrastate aspects in the same way that landline
service-provided with fixed network terminalswas separated.8 4

Nevertheless, their legislative

task was only half completed: section 332 provides
an exception to 2(b) only to the extent that it
preempts state regulation of the "entry of or the
rates charged by" any commercial mobile service;
this left states with the authority to regulate the
"other terms and conditions" of commercial mo83
84

47 U.S.C. §152(b).
H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in

U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587 (1993).
85

See 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A).

See also Part W.A. infra

(discussion of the meaning and ambiguity of the "other

terms and conditions" language).
86 See, e.g., Second CMRS Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
1478, para. 175, and 1480-81, paras. 180-82.
87
47 U.S.C. §332(c) (3) (B).
88 See, e.g., In re Petition of the People of the State of California and the Public Utility Commission of the State of California to Retain Reg. Authority over Intrastate Cellular Service Rates, Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 796 (1995);
In re Petition on Behalf of the Louisiana Public Service Commission for Authority to Retain Existing Jurisdiction over
Commercial Mobile Radio Services Offered Within the State
of Louisiana, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7898 (1995); In re
Petition of New York State Public Service Commission to Extend Rate Regulation, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8187
(1995); In re Petition of Arizona Corporation Commission,
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd.
7824 (1995); In re Petition on Behalf of the State of Hawaii,
Public Utility Commission, for Authority to Extend its Rate
Regulation of Commercial Mobile Radio Services in the State
of Hawaii, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7872 (1995); In re
Petition of the State of Ohio for Authority to Continue to
Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7842 (1995); In re Petition of the Connecticut Department Public Utility Control to Retain Regulatory
Control of the Rates of Wholesale Cellular Service Providers
in the State of Connecticut, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
7025 (1995), affd sub nom., Connecticut Dep. Pub. Util. Control
v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
89 See Second CMRS Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
1475-85, paras. 164-198; In re Further Forbearance from Title II Regulation for Certain Types of CMRS Providers, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 2164 (1994). The 1994
FurtherForbearanceNPRM proceeding was terminated in light

bile services.8

5

Importantly, the FCC declined to permit any
state to continue regulating prices for broadband
CMRS services.8 6 Some states had regulated cellular services and requested permission to continue
doing so under the provisions of section 332 allowing those states to petition for a continuation
of state regulation subject to FCC approval.8 7 The
FCC, correctly following Congressional intent, declined to grant permission in every case.88 The
FCC also elected to exercise section 332's new
grant of forbearance authority to remove many
common carrier regulations inapplicable to mobile carriers or in a competitive context.8 9 The
FCC's decisions in this area followed a long line of
FCC precedent based on the principle that unnecessary regulations create efficiency losses and
harm consumers. 90 The FCC correctly continues
to examine forbearance from traditional common
carrier regulations for CMRS, 9 1 although many
point out that the FCC has not been sufficiently
of the enhanced forbearance authority in the 1996 Act,
which utilized different criteria for regulatory forbearance.
See In re Personal Communications Industry Association's
Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance's Petition for Forbearance For Broadband Personal Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 16,857, 16,860, para. 6
(1998) [hereinafter PCIA Forbearance Order]. The FCC also
denied a petition filed by GTE seeking forbearance from certain operator service requirements of the Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act (TOCSIA). See In re
Petition for a Declaratory Ruling that GTE Airfone, GTE
Railfone, and GTE Mobilnet are not subject to the Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of
1990, Declaratory Ruling, 8 FCC Rcd. 6171 (1993); PCIA Forbearance Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 16,860, para. 5.
90 See, e.g., In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C. 2d 1, 5
(1980) (citing C.W. NEEDY, REGULATION-INDUCED DIsToRTIONS (1978)); Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C. 2d 59, 60-61
(1982).
91 See, e.g., In re Federal Communications Bar Association's Petition for Forbearance from Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act Regarding Non-Substantial Assignments of Wireless Licenses and Transfers of Control Involving Telecommunications Carriers," Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 6293 (1998) (forbearance granted from
rule requiring FCC pre-approval of non-substantial or pro
forma license transfers); PCIA ForbearanceOrder, 13 FCC Rcd.
16,857 (FCC grants partial forbearance from the requirement to file tariffs for international services and limited forbearance from certain operator services regulations, but declines to forbear from the international authorization
requirements of section 214 of the Act as well as the FCC's
resale rules); In re Interconnection and Resale Obligations
Pertaining to CMRS, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
18,455 (1996) (temporarily extending cellular resale obliga-
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pro-competitive and deregulatory in this area.9 2
As to the second goal, harmonization of regulatory treatment, certain services such as cellular
previously had been regulated as common carriage while others that were nonetheless potential
competitive substitutes were regulated as private
carriage. Eliminating this disparity in regulatory
treatment and ensuring similar treatment for similar services was a major impetus for the 1993 revisions; Congress adopted a new category of services
known as "commercial mobile radio services," or
CMRS. 93

There was a third aspect to the 1993 revisions to
the Act as well; a revision related to CMRS's status
as a substitute for local exchange service. In the
1993 revisions, Congress exempted CMRS from
"requirements imposed by a State Commission on
all providers of telecommunications services necessary to ensure the continued availability of telephone exchange service at affordable rates," except where CMRS became a substitute for
landline telephone exchange service for a subtions but providing for the resale rule to sunset after five
years because competition will render it unnecessary); Commencement of Five-Year Period Preceding Termination of
Resale Rule Applicable to Certain Covered Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd.
17,427 (1998) (noting that the resale rule sunset date would
be tolled as of Nov. 25, 1997, the date on which the Commission completed its award of the last group of initial PCS
licenses, yielding a sunset date of Nov. 25, 2002).
92
See PCIA ForbearanceOrder, 13 FCC Rcd. at 16,934 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold FurchtgottRoth).
The majority decision [in the forebearance order] denies most of the subject request to forbear based on
speculative fears and outdated rationales that raise the
bar so high that future and pending forbearance petitions-even in the most competitive segment of the telecommunications industry and in geographic markets
that are fully competitive-do not seem to stand a
chance.
Id. (separate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell,
dissenting in part).
93

See 1993 OBRA Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

103-213, at 494; 47 U.S.C. §332(d).
94

1993 OBRA Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-

213, at 492.
95
See, e.g., David J. Roddy, Economic Analysis of the Cost
Structure of the PCS/Wireless Telecommunications Industry and the
Implied Value of BroadbandPCS Spectrum, Economics and Technology, Inc., Sept. 1994; HUBER, supra note 69, at 1.

96 See, e.g., In re Petition of Arizona Corporation Commission to Extend State Authority Over Rate and Entry Regulation of All Commercial Mobile Radio Services; Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications ActRegulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Report and Order
and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 7824, 7834, para.

39-41 (1995). Arizona had attempted to justify its request

stantial portion of the communications within
such State. 94 At the time, local competition had
not yet been authorized, even at the state level.
The proliferation of cellular (and soon to be PCS)
services was seen as a threat to the local exchange
carriers and to the existing system of subsidies
supporting "universal service." PCS in particular,
was advertised as any number of things-a lowpriced, go-anywhere, single-number, voice/data/
messaging service-and popularly understood as
a service likely to "explode" on the public with
enormous and far-reaching consequences for tele95
communications .
The proliferation of such an attractive substitute for local exchange services was thought to be
able to harm universal service. 9 6 By substituting
for LEC services, PCS customers could also bypass
the LEC to reach traditional long-distance carriers, thus bypassing the system of access charges
and threatening the LEC revenue streams that
made up universal service. 9 7 Remember, at that

time local competition had not yet been authorfor continued regulation of cellular on the basis that cellular
substitution was reducing LEC revenues, thereby harming
universal service. The FCC responded that Arizona's request
was unnecessary because section 332(c)(3) permits any
state-even without rate regulation authority-to require
CMRS carriers to contribute to universal service funds "where
such [CMRS] services are a substitute for land line telephone
exchange service for a substantial portion of the communications within such State." See also 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(3). The
"substantial substitute" precondition of section 332
has, of
course, effectively been read out of the Act by operation of
section 254(f) ("Every telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications service shall contribute,
on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, in a manner
determined by the State to the preservation and advancement of universal service in that State").
97 See HUBER, supra note 69, at 1, figure 1.1 (citing Request of AT&T for a Pioneer's Preference, No. 91-314, at 6-8
(May 4 1992)) (noting that AT&T's "ultimate goal" is the
provision of "affordable, nationwide" radio-based personal
communications service, with "[f] eatures and quality comparable with the wireline network"); In re Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, 11 FCC Rcd. 5020, 5056, para. 77
(1996) [hereinafter LEC-CMRS Interconnection Notice]; Comments of LDDS WorldCom to the LEC-CMRS Interconnection

Notice, CC Docket 95-185, at 12 (Mar. 4, 1996); Reply Comments of United States Telephone Association to the LECCMRS InterconnectionNotice, at 14 (Mar. 25, 1996) (discussing

arbitrage and bypass opportunities created by the fact that
CMRS carriers do not pay interstate access charges). See also
CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1497, para. 228

(discussion of LEC-CMRS interconnection arrangements
prior to 1996 Act); In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 16,005 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]; Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d
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ized and regulators were expressing significant
concerns about "bypass" of LEC access arrangements by competitive providers. 98
PCS was thought to be so attractive-full mobility at prices comparable to existing landline telephone rates-that it would effectively replace
traditional landline service and potentially drive
the LEC out of business (or if the PCS was provided by a LEC, shift the LEC's focus away from its
wireline network). But as a federally licensed
wireless provider, CMRS would not be subject to
the same "regulatory contract" with the state commissions, e.g., the requirement to provide service
throughout a given geographic area, that ensured
"universal service." Thus Congress provided that
the FCC should permit states to regulate CMRS
where subscribers have no alternative means of
obtaining basic telephone service.?'
Admittedly, much of the concern about the potential of PCS and wireless services to harm universal service was a bit overblown; the growth of
wireless has so far been extensive, but has not
presented that degree of a threat to wireline carriers or to universal service cross-subsidies. Nevertheless, in this case, given a choice between the
regulated monopoly model and a deregulated,
competitive wireless model, Congressional action
established the competitive model as the framework for the "bargain" between government and
broadband CMRS carriers. Further, such Con-

gressional action might very well be necessary as
wireless businesses evolve, or as regulatory "creep"
threatens to intrude on the functioning of the
competitive market. For example, the statutory
and regulatory approach to CMRS universal service "requirements" was changed substantially by
further revisions to the Communications Act in
1996 and subsequent implementation.l°0
However, Congress did not follow the traditional wireline model to create a relationship of
protection and control between government and
the private capital needed to build wireless networks; instead, Congress created something very
different. The Communications Act's original
universal service mandate extends to a "wire and
radio communication service," not merely wireline local telephone service. But when it came to
cellular, PCS and other broadband mobile wireless services, the government created opportunities for private capital to obtain licenses and then
left it to the workings of the market to produce
investments in infrastructure, quality services and
affordable prices in all areas of the country. And
that approach has been at least as successful as the
monopoly/subsidy approach selected for wireline
local telephone service.
Even bearing in mind the fact that wireline telephone has had government protection and subsidy and at least a 100-year head start, wireless service is also available in nearly all areas of the

753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom., AT&T v. Iowa Utils.

as requiring CMRS carriers to contribute to a federal fund
pursuant to new 47 U.S.C. §254. Worse, the FCC required
CMRS carriers to do so based on measurement of their interstate (as opposed to intrastate) revenues, thus re-imposing
the obligation to divide traffic according to the intra/interstate distinction Congress had sought to eliminate for CMRS.

Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998) (LEC-CMRS interconnection
framework under the 1996 Act).
98

See, e.g., Nil Initiative, supra note 67, at 428.

Competitive access providers now are beginning to offer
local telephone service in competition with the BOCs.
They primarily serve the highly profitable business markets and are not concerned about subsidizing service in
less profitable markets. Additionally, unlike BOCs, competitive access providers do not have a substantial base of
installed equipment, with high capital depreciation costs
that must be included in their rate bases. If companies
like MCI continued to invest billions of dollars in developing competitive access services, BOCs could potentially lose significant shares in the markets that they rely
upon to subsidize universal service. In turn, telephone
service may become more expensive in rural and poor

areas.
See id. The Nil Initiative is particularly interesting and, one
can hope, anachronistic in suggesting that a single-wire, noncompetitive arrangement is the ideal method for promoting
access to advanced telecommunications capabilities.
99 47 U.S.C. §332(c) (3) (A).

o10The Universal Service Order adopted by the FCC observed, among other things, that states could require CMRS
carriers to contribute to state universal service funds, as well

See May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776. All

this "notwithstanding" language in section 332(c) (3) (A) was
intended to provide that states may only subject CMRS carriers to universal service requirements where they are a substitute for a substantial portion of the traffic within that state.
See 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A). See also In re Petition of Pittencrief Communications, Inc. for Declaratory Ruling Regarding
Preemption of the Texas Pub. Util. Reg. Act of 1995, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd.

1735 (1997).

Although debate on this point is beyond the scope of this
article, the FCC's decision to permit states to subject CMRS
carriers to new obligations to contribute to universal service
is open to question, given the language of section
332(c)(3)(A), which was not affected or amended by the
1996 amendments. Even if one accepts the FCC's view of the
legal and policy validity of the universal service contribution
mandate of section 254, the absence of any Congressional
amendment to section 332(c) (3) (A) leaves the meaning of
the latter section in doubt; the FCC has left that issue unexplained.
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country; a choice of at least three competitive
providers is available to 87 percent of the nation's
population. ' 0 ' Moreover, new investment in wireless networks has been significant. Market forces,
not regulatory mandates, stimulated an upgrade
of mobile networks from analog to digital technology. Competition is also expected to drive further
investment in mobile networks for the provision
of "third generation" services.
The competitive market model is considerably
more modern than the 19th century arrangements governing wireline carriers. Yet, when envisioning wireless carriers as competitors with wireline carriers for local telephone services it is not
the competitive model but often the wireline
model that policymakers expect broadband
CMRS carriers to follow. Perhaps the reason for
this odd result is that policymakers have not yet
fully reconciled their understanding of the competitive market with their expectations for how basic local telephone service will be provided. For a
variety of reasons, that service market is somehow
sacrosanct, and regulators feel a special obligation
to protect consumers of those services from market forces. Understanding better the competitive

market will be a necessary prerequisite to convincing policymakers to feel more comfortable with a
competitive approach to affordable, ubiquitous local telephone service.
IV.

THE INVISIBLE HAND OF
REVOLUTION: THE COMPETITIVE
MARKET

The tools used by competitive businesses to set
prices, invest in infrastructure and decide
whether to enter new markets are the standard
tools of business analysis: deriving estimates of
capital expenditures, projected demand and projected revenues, using the time-value of money to
determine the present value of the proposed investment and comparing that value to company
business plans and strategies. These tools may
also be used by policymakers to evaluate prices
and encourage investment and entry into new
markets. However, the more obvious process is to
estimate the likely success of various political strategies and to evaluate decisions based on whether
10
See Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at 19,768,
Appendix H.

they favor, disfavor or balance outcomes among
competing interest groups and industry segments.
This approach also differs by design from the
regulated monopoly environment in which the
ILECs operate. Indeed, the process of a competitive market even looks quite different from that
which regulators' theoretical approaches predict
a competitive (or a perfectly regulated) cost and
pricing structure would be. Regulators generally
assume that competition yields prices for all com-

petitive services at long-run incremental cost; the
outcome of a hypothetical "perfectly competitive"
market. But competitive firms' behavior is much
more complex than that, particularly in the telecommunications industry, where significant economies of scale are present.
As former FCC Chief Economist Joseph Farrell
has explained:
Unregulated competition does subtler things on
prices than bring price levels to cost in the long run. It

allows firms to cover common costs in creative and flexible ways. More generally, it lets firms experiment to
find how customers prefer to pay the costs they incur.
(Regulators can use economic principles to predict
what pricing structures should be efficient, but in the
end efficiency should be measured by what customers
actually want, not what we predict they will want.)
And it lets prices-both as consumption signals and
as investment signals-move at least somewhat in tandem with the first-best ideal, which, to oversimplify
somewhat, is short-run marginal cost when there is
plenty of capacity, and capacity-illingprice, perhaps well
above cost, when there is not. (Peak-load pricing is an
example of this kind of pricing.)
This is much subtler pricing behavior than "keep
prices near long-run cost", [sic] which is probably the
best that regulators can realistically do (trying to implement the first-best ideal would likely be terribly demanding in terms of information and extremely subject
to manipulation). The two coincide in long-run equilibrium, but transitory differences are likely to be important in industries in which investment and capacity
costs are important and demand is somewhat unpre-

dictable.
Pricing at long-run cost pays for investment, but
doesn't give the sharp signals "invest all-out in capacity"
or "don't invest in capacity," with their high-powered
02
incentives, that the unregulated market can give.1

Accordingly, expectations are misplaced that
broadband CMRS carriers competing for local telephone service minutes-from both wireless and
wireline competitors-will develop prices strictly
in relation to costs. Rather, prices are set, unsurprisingly, in response to "what the market will
102

Farrell, supra note 16, at 3-4.
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bear"; businesses design different pricing plans in
order to "segment" the market into discrete customer categories. By segmenting customers, businesses can both serve customers better with more
tailored service offerings and maximize earnings
by ensuring that prices carefully track demand.
Of course, this is precisely the type of pricing
with which regulators have long felt uncomfortable. Different prices based on different demand
elasticities means that some customers get "better" prices than others; regulators often mistakenly assume that this is the result of either discrimination or abuse of market power.""' Even in
competitive markets, however, there will be different demand elasticities for different services or
service elements. Competitive prices will respond
accordingly; policymakers will have to learn to grit
their teeth and allow the market to do so if they
are serious about favoring market competition as
the best way to obtain benefits for consumers and
maximize overall economic efficiency.
Infrastructure investment decisions are also
handled differently than in the traditional regulated wireline model. In a competitive market, a
firm would decline to invest in a particular strategy, i.e., introduce a new product or service, construct new facilities, or introduce new pricing
plans, when the marginal cost of that particular
investment exceeds the private marginal benefit,
adjusted for the time value of money. In other
words, a competitive business looks to see whether
the net present value ("NPV") of a particular
course of action is positive or negative.
Decisions are based in part on a standard business case analysis something like the following:
* An initial proposition to add value for the
customer or obtain additional revenue is developed and described. Advantages and disadvantages are listed.
* Demand estimates are compiled and multiplied by a particular price figure to arrive at expected total revenues. Of course, the interrelationship between price and demand must be
taken into account.
* Estimates of expenses are derived. These include both any up-front capital expenses as well as
operating expenses, i.e., expenses incurred
throughout the course of providing the new product, service or price plan. Such operating ex103

See, e.g., In reAmerican Tel. and Tel. Co., the Associ-

ated Bell System Companies, Charges ,for Interstate Telephone

penses might include technical and equipment
costs, marketing costs and overhead, customer
care and billing systems expenses. Depreciation
expenses are also involved.
* Revenues and expenses are compared to arrive at a preliminary calculation of earnings
before taxes. After taxes are figured in, the firm
has some estimate of how much revenue (or expense) is involved to arrive at a cash flow estimate.
* This process is then projected out over a
number of years to determine at what point the
process will reach a "break-even" point where demand has increased so as to yield sufficient revenues to both recover an appropriate share of capital expenses and cover operating costs.
This analysis then incorporates the time-value
of money, i.e., consideration of prevailing interest
rates and inflation, to determine whether allocating funds in the proposed manner will yield a positive return over the number of years estimated to
be necessary to reach the "break-even" point. Essentially, the process compares the present value
of the expected future benefits of a project to the
present value of the expected costs. If this calculation demonstrates that funds spent in this manner would not recover the cost of acquiring the
capital in the first place, the strategy is said to be
"net present value-negative" and would be rejected.
The firm will also calculate an internal rate of
return ("IRR"), an estimate of what the company
believes it will cost to obtain the capital needed
for that given expenditure. If this internal rate of
return is met exactly, the project is said to have an
NPV of zero. Effectively, then, the firm is neutral
as to whether it engages in the project or not.
The firm may also calculate a "hurdle rate," which
may be equal to or above the IRR and which represents the minimum return the firm will accept
before engaging in the investment project.
The competitive firm must also consider
whether funds might be better off spent elsewhere, thus comparing the value of this particular
strategy to others, including consideration that a
competing firm might in fact elect to pursue that
strategy and thereby gain a long-term advantage
11 4
in the marketplace.'
Regulated firms, of course, engage in similar
Service, 64 F.C.C. 2d 131, 469-70 (1976).
104
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G.
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business calculations, but the decisions they make
may differ substantially based on a number of factors unique to the environment of cost/price regulation. For a regulated firm, the question is perhaps as much whether market demand and
expected returns justify the investment as it is
whether the regulators will allow the investment
and ensure that the firm meets its "revenue requirement" by allowing the carrier to adjust prices
(and/or depreciation rates) as needed.
Thus, a LEC might choose to invest in certain
projects that a competitive firm may not. In the
worst case, the LEC will make certain investments
without ensuring that they will earn an adequate
return, on the assumption that the regulator will
either mistakenly approve the investment or be
forced somehow to protect the LEC from bankruptcy. On the other hand, a LEC may well be
required to invest in certain projects as part of its
"bargain" with the regulator. The universal service obligation is one example of this; subsidies
are the regulator's way of meeting the LEC revenue requirement in cases where competitive returns are insufficient.
Regulated firms might also choose not to invest
in advanced infrastructure if they feel that regulators will not approve the expenditure or impose
conditions on its use that change the net present
value analysis. From a regulator's perspective,
even if there may be competitive returns to be
earned from the investment, any short term cost
increases- much less periods where operating
cash flow is negative-might undermine the ability of a regulated wireline LEC to offer cheap basic services. And it might tempt the LEC into subsidizing that new investment with revenues earned
NONFINANCIAL MANAGERS (3d ed. 1992). See generally E. BRIGHAM,

FUNDAMENTALS

OF FINANCIAL

(6th ed.
CORPORATE Fi-

MANAGEMENT

1992); R. BREALY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
(4th ed. 1991).
105 Among these are also the increasing burdens of state,
local and federal taxes, including universal service taxes,
higher-than-cost interconnection rates and regulatory mandates for technological investment in advanced location capabilities, wiretap capacity and number portability. See Farquhar, supra note 3.
106 In re Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 18,455, 18,463, para. 14 (1996).
107
See In re Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 18,676 (1996); Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 22,665 (1997); Order, 13 FCC Rcd.
21,746 (1998).
NANCE

from the basic services, effectively further increasing the costs of basic service in a manner that is
not only competitively unfair, but which regulators would find "unnecessary" to the provision of
basic service. Caught betwixt and between, carriers with universal service obligations and other
government controls cannot make independent
business judgments on investments.
The key difference is that regulators seek to
maximize socialwelfare as they see it, which may or
may not reflect consumer welfare as expressed by
marketplace choices, nor will it necessarily reflect
investor welfare as it is calculated using the usual
analysis. In the case of a regulated firm, it is
much easier for regulators to compel investments
up to the point where, in effect, they believe social
marginal costs equal social marginal benefits.
With a regulated firm, then, the regulators can
choose whether to award rate increases (possible
only in a monopoly or near-monopoly environment) or collect subsidies to make up the difference in revenue.
This approach is leading to increasing costs of
doing business for all competitive firms.1 0 5 Too
often, the traditional monopoly-based approach
to service mandates is being applied not only to
regulated wireline carriers but to wireless carriers
as well. To its credit, the FCC has recognized that
"all regulation ... necessarily implicates costs,
including administrative costs, which should not be
imposed unless clearly warranted. " 10 6 But recent
policy decisions to compel the deployment of advanced location technology, 10 7 advanced wiretap
capability 0 8 and local number portability technology' 0 9 were made with little if any record evidence
as to expected consumer demand, revenues, oper108 See In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3149 (1997).
See also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §2522, and 47 U.S.C. §§229, 1001-10).
109 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §251 (b) (2)).
For wireless carriers, moreover, the requirement to deploy
local number portability was not a statutory requirement but
was imposed by the FCC on the speculative basis that it would
"aid competition in the wireless industry." In re
Telephone
Number Portability, FirstReport and Order and FurtherNotice of
ProposedRulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 8352 (1996); First Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 7236,
7283, para. 78 and Appendix E (1997). The FCC's Wireless
Bureau has elected to extend the deployment deadline for
this functionality until March 31, 2000. See In re Petition for
Extension of Implementation Deadlines of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, Memorandum Opinion
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ating expenses, capital expenses or net present
value. Admittedly, legal requirements and policy
decisions to foster the abilities of emergency access services or access to the disabled or preserve
law enforcement capabilities are not goals necessarily pursued for profit. But at the same time,
applying such mandates to competitive business
necessarily interferes with the more efficient and
more democratic process of allowing wireless customers (and potential customers) to determine
what qualities and capabilities they want from service.
Effective law enforcement, access to emergency
services and services suited to the needs of the disabled are all appropriate goals for telecommunications policy. But equating one particular investment activity or another with those goals begs the
question of whether particular investments are required. There are a number of existing, alternative methods of providing emergency services and
wiretap capabilities. Carriers have proven that
competitive market forces are sufficient to cause
them to respond to unique needs, for example, in
the case of a potential customer who is physically
disabled.
But regulatory proceedings too often did not
consider or give sufficient weight to business case
analysis, minimizing cost burdens and the ability
of market demand to meet particular goals.
Moreover, in some cases, such as number portability, record evidence regarding the costs and
benefits was considered, but such other considerations as number conservation drive the decisionmaking process.
The competitive market better serves consumers for at least one reason, a reason which is not
only economic but fundamentally democratic.
Social goals inevitably involve trade-offs between
costs and benefits, revenues and expenses. Admittedly, some social goals may be simply too important to leave unfunded or unmet. If that is the
case, it is unlikely that carriers will succeed in
reaching as many customers as possible if important features desired by the public are not a part

of their service offering. When government undertakes to speak for the public, it runs the risk
that its decisions will not truly reflect the interests
of the public at large, but merely those of a particular segment which happens to have influential
friends in Congress or at a regulatory commission.
In order for regulatory mandates to be fully accountable, there must be some objective basis for
assessing their relative costs and benefits. For investments in advanced technologies, decisions to
tax certain services to subsidize others or in any
case where carriers (and their shareholders) are
required to make investments not supported by
ordinary business planning, regulators' public interest obligations to consumers strongly suggest
that regulators must conduct some calculation as
to the present value of a projected decision and
explain to the public why it has elected to impose
these costs.
In the regulated monopoly world, it was possible for regulators to compel particular investments or service offerings and then adjust prices
or other factors such as depreciation rates so as to
minimize the impact on subscribers. In a competitive market, firms such as wireless carriers cannot
simply "absorb" costs imposed by regulators because competition for capital investment does not
permit carriers to "absorb" costs and thereby reduce their margins or returns to shareholders.
This is true for both types of government mandates: new capital investments and new tax expenditures such as universal service contribution
obligations.
Even if a tax is nominally levied only on carriers, the burden of the tax is borne by consumers
in addition to the owners and employees of the
carriers themselves. " " And even if consumer
rates do not rise, the effect of increased taxes is
that the consumer enjoys a smaller reduction in
prices than would otherwise be the case in a competitive market."1 Competitive businesses understand that certain social goals require taxation or
investment mandates, but regulators must understand that they have an obligation to measure the

and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 16,315 (1998). Additionally, the FCC

statement of Commissioner Rachelle B. Chong) (noting that
the ultimate cost of any universal service obligations will be
with consumers); In re Report in Response to Senate Bill
1768 and Conference Report on H.R. 3579, Report to Congress,
12 FCC Rcd. 11,810, 11,866 (1998) (dissenting statement of

has before it a pending CTIA petition for forbearance from
the number portability requirements. See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on CTIA Petition Requesting Forbearance From CMRS Number Portability Requirements, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd. 955 (1998).
110 See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 87 (1996) (separate

Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
I1I See, e.g., id. at 11862 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth).
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costs and benefits of such programs to ensure
they comport with the public interest, because the
competitive market does not permit price adjustments and cost recovery in the same way possible
in a regulated market.
Finally, as much as policymakers may claim to
favor competition, they are primarily political actors and recognize that there is uncertainty about
how a competitive market will play politically.
Competition is often an economic castor oil: it is
good for the economy but politically unpopular,
particularly when the industry is used to the comfortable predictability of a regulated market. As
one example, when the airlines were deregulated
in the late 1970s, some of the immediate symptoms were bankrupt airlines, confused customers
and economic uncertainty.
Other results of airline deregulation, of course,
have been lower overall fares, service innovations
such as frequent flier clubs, greater market segmentation (for example, "business class" service)
and larger volumes of traffic. The larger volume
and lower fares are indications that the "universal
service" goals of affordability and accessibility
were somewhat enhanced by airline deregulation.
But airline deregulation has also reduced the
number of direct flights into a number of smaller
markets. Some aspects of service quality, such as
the size of the seats, have declined (at least according to anecdotal evidence). Until enough
time passed for consumers to forget about how
the old system worked and a new generation of
consumers to arise, the general reaction of the
public to a "pro-competitive, deregulated" airline
market was not positive.1 1 2
Long-distance telecommunications operate in a
competitive market, although there are some notable disagreements with that premise. 113 But
112

See supra note 36. See also W.J.

BAUMOL

& J.

GREGORY

there should be little disagreement that long-distance services are notoriously hard to compare on
the basis of price and are perhaps even more difficult to compare on the basis of quality. 114 Longdistance services, far from being the single AT&T
Long Lines choice of prices from long ago, are
now available in a wide variety of price plans and
custom calling plans (factoring in time-of-day discounts, calling circles or "Friends and Family"
programs), not to mention hundreds of "dialaround" companies who compete solely for minutes, not for subscriptions, based on price and advertising. Long distance companies have even begun advertising on the basis that choosing their
firm will in fact end the possibility of confusing
choices, in that they offer "one rate-all the
time." As the humorist Dave Barry has quipped,
"Don't tell me any more about my long-distance
options. The more I know about my long-dis1
tance options, the more I feel like an idiot."

15

Customers of wireless services see many of the
same developments in response to new competi
tion. As the FCC's thorough reports on competition indicate, wireless firms offer bundled minute
packages, "home-zone" pricing, special long-distance and "roaming" rates and pre-paid service.
Some have even begun advertising "one rate"
plans similar to those of long-distance companies,
in response to the bewildering array of choices. 116
In both cases, this "bewildering array" of choices
is a positive development for consumers, who are
now far more likely to be offered a service package tailored to their needs and are less likely to
overpay for unwanted services or features. And in
both cases, the bewildering array would very likely
not have arisen were these businesses operating in
1 17
a regulated pricing arrangement.

2 (1994)
(noting the "largely unmerited unpopularity" of passenger
airline deregulation).
113
See, e.g.,
PAUL W. MAcAvoY, THE FAILURE OF ANTI-

their competitors and use alternative, least-cost routing, and
because transmission of a long-distance call involves at least
two local exchange carriers at either end, the quality of individual networks is particularly difficult to measure. See generally New Network: Sprint Unveils Revolutionary Network, EDGE,

TRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-

June 8, 1998.

SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LocAL TELEPHONy

DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996). Another fact to bear

in mind is that while long-distance service may be competitive, a major cost input to that product (LEC access services)
is often not supplied under competitive market conditions.
114
Long-distance carriers once advertised based on the
quality of their networks, e.g., Sprint's famous "pin-drop" ads.
But consumers are less able to track, itemize and compare
the quality of individual calls in the same way that they can
compare prices, i.e., by comparing individual bills. Moreover, because many of the major carriers lease capacity from

Quote from the Dave Barry Calendar, 1996 version.
See, e.g., Third Competition Report, 13 FCC Rcd. at
19,768-75.
115

116

117

Some economists and policymakers have in fact ar-

gued for deregulation as a precedent to rather than a reward
for increased competition. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 16, at
sec. 3. See also Michael K. Powell, CommunicationsPolicy Leadershipfor the Next Century, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 529 (1998) (ad-

vocating enforcement rather than prospective regulation).
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V.

SO YOU SAY YOU WANT A
REVOLUTION: NEXT STEPS FOR
ENCOURAGING LOCAL COMPETITION
FROM BROADBAND CMRS CARRIERS

A.

A Pricing Revolution: End Pricing Subsidies
and Allow for LEC Pricing Flexibility
Regarding Local Telephone Services

As former FCC economist Joseph Farrell explained above, "unregulated competition does
subtler things on prices than bring price levels to
cost in the long run. It allows firms to cover common costs in creative and flexible ways. More generally, it lets firms experiment to find how customers prefer to pay the costs they incur."11 8 If
the optimal pricing system is one based on unregulated competition, or which at least mimics the
outcomes of unregulated competition, then the
existing rigid pricing structure for local telephone
services is less than optimal.
Taking into account concerns of efficiency and
affordability, there is absolutely no reason that
residential telecommunications services are best
priced as a package of below-cost local calling and
above-cost non-local calling, particularly when
both services are offered by the same firm. Moreover, that arrangement has significant drawbacks
with respect to encouraging competition. Moving
toward an arrangement where wireless and wireline services compete on price requires that both
wireless and wireline prices respond to normal
economic signals regarding costs and demand.
Presently, that condition is impossible to achieve
because of the system of subsidy and regulation
which permits regulators to enforce artificially low
prices for local telephone service.
In Europe, mobile phone usage is much higher
than in the United States; the extent to which mobile phones are used has even created cultural differences. For example, in Europe, it is perfectly
appropriate for a business group to sit down to
lunch and set their mobile phone, turned on,
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next to their lunch plate for the duration of the
meal. Not surprisingly, the ratio of wireless to
landline prices in Europe is about 4:1, while in
the United States, the ratio is about 8:1.119 Europe's smaller disparity in prices leads to greater
substitution of wireless usage for wireline usage.
Greater usage, in turn, leads to greater network
capacity and investment and to further progress
toward wireless systems that operate as competi1 20
tive substitutes for landline telephones.
The pricing disparity in the United States is due
to a structure for local telephone prices that distorts pricing signals and is heavily biased towards
wireline local exchange services-again, a legacy
of the 19th century monopoly approach. In both
wireless and wireline services, network costs are
incurred when the subscriber either initiates or
receives a call.1 2 1 In CMRS, a usage-sensitive
charge is assessed in both situations, on a per-call
basis. However, many wireline telephone subscribers pay a flat rate for unlimited local calling
and do not pay any additional charges for calls received, regardless of the calling party's location.1 22 Reform of pricing practices for residential wireline local exchange services is necessary to
reduce this wireline-wireless price disparity. Absent reform, policymakers are simply protecting
wireline competitors at the expense of competition, particularly competition from broadband
CMRS.
Perhaps an equally problematic aspect of the
United States arrangement is the fact that the subsidies for low local telephone service rates are
raised through taxes and implicit contributions
charged to other potential local telephone service
competitors. Even apart from the deleterious effects on competition, this arrangement creates
significant economic inefficiencies. Considering
the effects on consumer welfare as a top priority,
studies have shown that raising the rates of long
distance and wireless services significantly depresses demand for those services,123 not only

Farrell, supra note 16, at sec. 2.
119 Low wireless premiums have also aided penetration
increases in other markets with CPP, such as Australia, Japan
and Israel. See SEPTEMBER 1997 YANKEE GROUP REPORT at 20
(citing YANKEE GROUP, WIRELESS PRICING: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT (Nov. 1996)).

gations currently imposed on wireline carriers are appropriate for mobile wireless carriers. See, e.g., 1999 Review of the

In 1999, the European Commission commissioned a

mobile carrier's networks, due to the additional functions of

study to examine consumer demand and the implications of
the convergence of fixed and mobile networks on its existing
regulations. The Commission will be considering many of
the issues discussed herein, such as whether regulatory obli-

locating the proper mobile subscriber to whom the call is to

118

120

Telecommunications Regulatory Framework, ONP Committee discussion document, ONPCOM98-42, Directorate General XIII
(Sept. 11, 1998).
121
In fact, the costs of call termination are greater in

be delivered.
122
123

See Policy Notice, 2 FCC Rcd. at 5210, para. 15.
See generally ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD

1999]

You Say You Want a Revolution?

retarding the growth of telecommunications services but creating substantial deadweight losses in
efficiency. 124 One study estimates the benefits of
rate rebalancing conforming more closely with
economic principles to be an annual welfare gain
125
of almost $8 billion for the U.S. economy.
Essentially, what we have in U.S. telecommunications policy is an arrangement referred to in
European regulatory parlance as an "access deficit
contribution scheme." As the European Commission has noted,
In principle, access deficit schemes take the retail price
structure (or the profitability of the various business areas) of the incumbent as the starting point for calculating the interconnection price and allow a discount on
these prices to give the price for interconnect for a particular type of call or service. The calculation is therefore top down, rather than a bottom up approach
based on the actual costs incurred.
As a result, any access deficit scheme will prevent effective competition from becoming established as competitors (entrants) will be forced to charge higher
prices for those services, which contribute to the incumbent's access deficit. This type of interconnection pricing regime undermines the incentives for the incumbent to orient its prices towards cost. These effects
distort investments within the industry and can only be
considered as a126
temporary exception to the Treaty competition rules.

In the interests of competition, the European
Commission has ruled that such "access deficit
schemes" may be implemented on only a temporary basis until January 1, 2000.127
From the perspective of a U.S. broadband
CMRS carrier or other potential local competitors, rate rebalancing would yield better information about how and whether to price services so as
to compete with local residential service. Even accounting for the difficulty of allocating joint and
WAVERMAN, TALK Is CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1995); LESTER D.

TAYLOR,

AND PRACICE

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

DEMAND

IN THEORY

(1994).

124 Jerry Hausman notes that for each additional dollar
of tax, the additional burden on the economy is $2.25, yielding a deadweight loss greater than the revenue raises. HAUSMAN, supra note 15, at 14. See also In re Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd.
24,744 (1998) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth).
125
See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 123, at 93.
126
Assessment Criteriafor National Schemes for the Costing
and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommunications and
Guidelinesfor the Member States on Operationof such Schemes, European Commission Communication COM (96) 608, (Nov.
27, 1996) (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/
legreg/com96608.html#annexb> [hereinafter European Universal Service Guidelines].

common costs across the multiple services provided by an ILEC, the incumbent service provider
provides services at levels below any reasonable allocation of the costs associated with that service.
Therefore, it is not surprising that little competition has arisen in these circumstances, even from
other facilities-based carriers. 128 Similarly, inefficient entry into access markets would be forestalled by rate rebalancing, because it would eliminate artificially high prices for those services that
129
may encourage such inefficient entry.
Rate rebalancing is particularly important to facilitating competition from broadband CMRS carriers. Absent rate rebalancing, capturing local telephone subscriptions from the wireline carrier
requires CMRS carriers to make either uneconomic price reductions or to apply for eligibility
to receive subsidies. Building a business case on
government subsidies, of course, conflicts with the
broadband CMRS carriers' deregulatory, procompetitive business approach. With the prospect of subsidies comes both the susceptibility of
the business plan to changes in government policy and the prospect of extensive regulatory obligations in return. Devolving into the regulatory
status of a LEC, subject to state commission regulation of rates, services and investments, is equally
untenable for wireless carriers.
Many broadband CMRS offer consumers the
option of purchasing large bundled packages of
minutes in an range designed to be affordable for
a broad base of customers. Although these services cannot compete with the $10-15 a month unlimited local usage packages made possible by
wireline subsidies, they are proving to be popular
See id.
Seen from another competitive perspective, if telephone services were fully deregulated and an ILEC elected to
price local residential service as it presently does under state
regulation-subsidized by access services provided to competitors-it might well face antitrust claims. See supranote 17
(European Commission considers that artificially low prices
are contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty). Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome prohibits "abuse of a dominant position." See
Treaty to Establish the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (popularly known as
"Treaty of Rome").
129
See, e.g., In re Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers; Transport
Rate Structure and Pricing Usage of the Public Switched Network by Information Service and Internet Access Providers,
11 FCC Rcd. 21,354, 21,376, para. 42 (1996) ("Current access
charges distort competition in the markets for local exchange access").
127

128
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among consumers. More importantly, a wireless
carrier's $70/month package for 500 minutes of
calling anywhere in the nation can compete for
subscriptions from customers who spend a combined $70/month or more on both local and
long-distance calling. At the present moment,
however, few customers incur a sufficient amount
of monthly long-distance charges to make such a
wireless package competitive. Mass-market substitution of wireless for wireline is therefore unlikely
until rate rebalancing brings greater parity between the costs of wireline local and wireless local
calling.130

1. The Heart of the Revolution: Universal Service
Reform
Nothing about "rate rebalancing" proposals
suggests changes that would yield monthly local
wireline prices above a reasonable measure of affordability. For example, subsidies remain necessary, in rural areas where costs are very different,
there can be non-distorting ways to provide for
that. Among policymakers, there are innumerable statements about how local phone prices must
not rise, but the only economic explanation
given-falling penetration-has not been proven
in scientific studies to have any merit. Moreover,
none of these arguments explain why any increase
is economically harmful. 1 31 It is perhaps true to
say that present rates are affordable, but quite another thing to make the statement that any price
above that rate is per se unaffordable.
Granting that universal service and affordability
are an essential element of the consumer welfare
calculus, telecommunications policy should rec-
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ognize that unaffordable long-distance charges
are the primary cause of disconnections. 13 2 Moreover, other economic studies have shown that local service rates have relatively little impact on
consumer decisions on whether to purchase telephone service. A 1993 study by three noted economists found, moreover, that a mild form of rate
rebalancing-the introduction of the $3.50 subscriber line charge-in fact increasedtelephone penetration, because of offsetting decreases in longdistance prices. 133 And yet another found no significant effects on subscription levels from rate
34
rebalancing.1
Competition is likely dealt a blow when the subsidies for wireline local telephone service rates are
raised through taxes and implicit contributions
charged to potential local telephone service competitors. This situation does not have to persist,
although full reform may require legislative action. 3

5

A system of support for consumers for

whom basic telecommunications services would
otherwise be unaffordable can be developed
through payments to consumers, paid for from
general tax revenues. The payments could be
made in the form of vouchers entitling the consumer to a discounted service rate; the discount
can be as large as necessary. This system has much
in common with a number of other social programs, but it has the beneficial aspect of not distorting consumer's choices between telecommunications service providers nor giving one
competitor a government-created cost advantage.
Investment incentives for those carriers who
risk capital to bring services to otherwise
uneconomically advantageous areas will not
change: they will still be somewhat dependent on

As another point of comparison, unlimited monthly

SLC to subsidize "universal service" (really the joint and com-

local telephone service is far below the monthly cost of cable

mon costs of LEC networks) was extraordinarily smaller than
the losses created by new taxes on wireless and long-distance
service. See also Hausman, supra note 15, at 18.

130

television, even though, for cable television, the operator
must not only build a local network but must also pay for the

content.
131 Moreover, broadband CMRS in many cases functions
as a second line; certainly no one believes we need below-cost
universal subsidies for a second line. Regardless of one's position on universal service, there is absolutely no good reason
why broadband CMRS and ILECs cannot compete on a
purely unsubsidized basis for additional telephone services
above and beyond basic connectivity.
132 See, e.g., Milton L. Mueller & Jorge R. Schement, Six

Myths of Telephone Penetration:Universal Service From the Bottom
Up, RUTGERS U. PROIECT ON INFO. POL'Y at 9 (1994).

133 See Jerry Hausman et al., The Effects of the Breakup of
AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the United States, 83 AM.
ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC. 178-84 (1993). These economists also found that the efficiency losses of increasing the

134
See Peter K. Pitsch & David P. Teolis, Price Reform and
Universal Service: Not Mutually Exclusive, PUB. UTIL. REP., Mar.

15, 1996, at 29 (restructuring in Illinois resulted in no significant drop in household penetration rates).
135 It is not certain that reform of the Communications
Act is necessary. Section 254 of the Communications Act

presently requires every telecommunications carrier to contribute in an equitable and nondiscriminatory manner. See
47 U.S.C. §254(d). This condition can still be met, however,
where the costs of any needed subsidies are paid for out of
general tax revenues, because most carriers (with the exception of certain cooperatively organized phone companies)
pay the usual generally applicable income and sales taxes. See
LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY 210-12 (1987).
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political support of subsidy programs, and they
will still have to consider the potential impact of
competitive entry into their markets. Provided
they continue to retain the same level of customers, they should see no change in revenues or in
their cost of capital. Indeed, many rural telephone companies can and should continue to
benefit from other subsidy programs paid for out
of general tax revenues that facilitate their access
to capital, such as those provided by the Rural
13 6
Utilities Service.
One interesting paper on this subject contends
that "there is no reason to believe that a system
based on general tax revenues would be better." 137

But, as noted above, there are at least

three reasons why such a system would be better:
1) it would raise the needed revenues more efficiently and at less overall cost to the U.S. economy; 2) it would avoid stifling competition by taxing one set of competitors to subsidize the rates of
another, and 3) it would allow the costs of the
program to be identified and measured to be sure
that sufficient, but not excessive, amounts of revenue are available for this purpose. It is the last
criteria, however, that many-including the author of this article -identify as a negative. For
example, the paper argues that, if raised through
general tax revenues, "universal service funds
would be subject to the vagaries of periodic
budget battles, which would not lend the system
the certainty that is conducive to efficient investment in infrastructure. Appropriations for universal service would be, like highway appropriations, essentially just another 'pork-barrel'
38
project."1
Indeed, federal appropriations for universal
service would be subject to the harsh light of public debate and the democratic process among the
public at large, rather than within only the small
collective of unelected telecommunications regulators. This fundamentally anti-democratic objection to a general tax revenue approach to funding
ascribes to universal service a status as a policy
goal above and beyond competing policy goals
which is by no means justified. Universal service
136
See7 U.S.C. §6942; 7 C.F.R. §§1610.1-1610.11 (1999)
(establishing the Rural Telephone Bank under the aegis of
the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service).
137
Kathleen Wallman, The Telecommunications Act of
1996: Congress' Vision for Universal Service for Rural America, at
11 (visited June 8, 1999) <www.opastco.org>.
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Id.

has an important status, to be sure; one attested to
by Congress. But it is by no means self-evident
that Congress intended the FCC and the states to
structure the universal service program so as to
hide its costs from the general public and set it
beyond debate. 139 This type of dictatorial action-declaring one policy goal to be "more equal
than others"-is precisely the type of action democratic revolutions are intended to redress.
Moreover, the argument simply does not withstand examination, for two reasons. First, as the
argument presumes, telecommunications infrastructure requires substantial up-front investments, requiring some anticipated level of demand or other investment incentive in return.
Advanced telecommunications facilities are, in
economists' parlance, "sunk costs." But if the
money is appropriated by Congress for such investments, and the money is then spent on such
infrastructure, the infrastructure is already there
for use in rural areas, and uncertainty about future appropriations is irrelevant. Once a highway
is built, the concrete stays in the ground regardless of the temperature of Congressional debate
over "pork barrel" projects. Moreover, Congress
could provide that the money, once appropriated
and loaned to rural investors, e.g., through the
Rural Utilities Service, could be "off the table" for
future appropriations debates.
Second, The only reason, of course, to stifle
Congressional debate would be because Congressional support of such goals is not as strong as universal service advocates presume. But if Congress
really has found universal service to be so important with respect to competing policy goals as to
be beyond debate, then it is absurd to then argue
that Congress will, left to the appropriations process, fail to sufficiently provide for universal service. My argument perhaps ascribes to Congress
more rationality and consistency than experience
would warrant, but the competing "Congress
can't be trusted" argument, as it is used here, is
inconsistent in its cynicism. In other words, there
is no objective reason to ascribe greater confidence that the FCC and state commissions - rather
139
In a recent statement, FCC Commissioner Harold
Furchtgott-Roth compiled a substantial body of evidence to
show that the FCC was, in fact, attempting to hide the facts of
the program from the public. See In re Truth-in-Billing and
Billing Format, First Report and Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket 98-170 (May 11, 1999) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth).
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than Congress - will adequately provide for universal service. The argument smells of both partisanship and an even deeper cynicism, i.e., that a
Democratic FCC will be both more generous and
better able than Congress to stifle public debate
over universal service taxes.
Consumers would likely benefit from such reform, even in ways unrelated to increased competition and choice. The present system of distributing subsidies directly to local telephone carriers is
a scattershot approach to distribution. It subsidizes many customers who need no such subsidies, but fails to provide sufficient support to
those who most need it. FCC data demonstrates
that low income, unemployed and minority individuals have far lower penetration rates for basic
service than do other households. 411 Indeed, the
present un-targeted system subsidizes many people's second and third telephone lines without
providing sufficiently targeted support to those
who need assistance to afford a single basic con41
nection. 1
Moreover, FCC studies show little or no correlation between telephone penetration and whether
the service area is "rural" or "urban." The District
of Columbia, entirely urban, has a penetration
rate of 91.0 percent, while a rural state such as
1 42
It
Utah has a penetration rate of 97.0 percent.
would be beneficial to increase, if not ensure, affordability for low-income, minority individuals.
A more targeted subsidy arrangement is far more
likely to accomplish that goal and permit the added benefit of increasing the chances that these
individuals will have the opportunity to select
140
See FCC, Telephone Penetration By Income By State, at 26
(Feb. 2, 1999). The average telephone penetration rate is
94.1 percent, which is unchanged from the prior reporting
period. Penetration rates for Hispanic and African-American
households, however, are below 90 percent. See id.
It is also worth noting that the Federal-State Joint
141
Board agreed that support for a second connection is not
necessary. See May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
at 8829, para. 94. Instead, the usual objection to subsidizing
only a single line per household is the administrative difficulty involved: it would require the providing carrier to
gather data on the living arrangements of the individuals in
the household, etc. A targeted voucher system would be administratively simple by contrast: the only data points required would be to measure reported household income just
as many other targeted social programs do and to develop a
reasonable measure of telephone service costs, using the
wireline incumbent's costs (not prices) as a benchmark. The
FCC has already undertaken to model such costs for non-rural carriers; rural carriers' costs can be approximated
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from a choice of competing providers, wireless
and wireline.
143
The only obstacles appear to be political.
There are several possible explanations for this.
First, most phone calls are still local. Local phone
prices, under the control of state regulatory commissions, are prime targets for politicians looking
for issues upon which to gain popular support.
Thus state commissions feel significant pressure
to maintain low basic local phone rates and, for
the most part, to leave the high cost of interstate
phone service to federal authorities. Second, the
FCC, although an independent agency, is both a
creation of Congress and led by Commissioners
appointed by the Executive Branch. The ability of
the Commissioners to make decisions independent from political considerations is tenuous at
best. There is a strong perception among politicians that local price increases, even coupled with
significant decreases in long-distance rates or the
availability of competitive choices, will be met with
a substantial outcry from both the public and industry, who have long been accustomed to the
present pricing arrangements, and will be treated
as an "abdication" of public responsibility.
Here is where telecommunications policy leadership must act. The industry as a whole-incumbent local exchange carriers, new competitive
LECs, long-distance companies and wireless carriers-has advocated some form of rate rebalancing
and pricing flexibility for local exchange services.
As but one example, in his separate statement to
the 1997 Universal Service Order, Chairman Reed
Hundt announced that the Commission's decithrough the cost data already used by the National Exchange
Carrier Association to develop an "average schedule" tariff
for rural LECs. The difference between the cost measure
and an affordability benchmark (formulated as a sliding scale
based on household income) could be provided directly to
the consumer.
See FCC, Trends in Telephone Service, 17-1, 17-4 (Feb.
142
19, 1999). Of course, to some extent high penetration rates
in rural areas reflect the workings of existing subsidy policies.
But with a targeted approach, the costs of universal service
programs could be reduced while increasingtheir effectiveness at maintaining penetration levels in all areas of the
country, urban and rural.
143
According to one set of commentators, the rule of
thumb among state regulators is said to be the "pizza test":
the monthly fee for basic residential phone service must not
exceed the price of a medium size pizza with two ingredients.
See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 4 n.2 (1992).
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sion assured no increases in local basic residential
telephone service "by any action of the Commission or Congress, although industry achieved consensus in urging us specifically to increase local
service prices by raising the residential subscriber
144

line charge.."

The FCC itself has observed that its present system of local telephone pricing and regulation is
not sustainable over the long run. 14 5 Even considering the wireline local exchange/access services
market, the present regulatory system is breaking
down and must be reformed in significant ways.
Common sense dictates that a government-regulated system of subsidized prices cannot co-exist
with competition and is unfair to both the ILECs
and potential competitors alike. However, common sense is being ignored, paving the way for
further revolution.
Recent universal service decisions, including
the provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, suggest that policymakers are interested in
two contradictory goals. First, there is an interest
in preserving subsidized and averaged local telephone prices, government influence on investment decisions and consumer "protection" functions for regulatory commissions. Yet at the same
time, policymakers want to introduce competition, with its attendant unregulated and de-averaged prices, business-model control of investment
decisions and consumer protection, achieved only
through market forces and antitrust enforcement.
Needless to say, the two approaches may not exist
1 46
harmoniously.
But of course, this impossible arrangement has
been tried by Congress, the FCC and the state
commissions alike since the days of the Above 890
decision, 1 47 with competition so far getting the

worse end of the deal. There has been no polit144
May 1997 Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 9263
(separate statement of Chairman Reed Hundt).
145
In re Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12
FCC Rcd. 15,982, 15,996-97, para. 32 (1997) [hereinafter Access Charge Reform Order].
146 This is not to say that some system of support cannot
be created for high-cost or low-income subscribers that is less
harmful to the competitive market. One arrangement discussed in the universal service record involves broad-based
taxes, such as income taxes, and targeted subsidies. See Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., to In re FederalState Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, CC
Dkt. No. 96-45, at 21-27, 31-33 (Jan. 26, 1998).
147
See NAKIL SUNG, COMPETITION AND TECHNICAL

CHANGE IN THE
LOGG,

U.S.

TELEPHONE INDUSTRY

56 (1997);

KEL-

supranote 143, at 591-97 (1992) (discussing Above 890,

ical consensus yet in favor of a fully competitive
market for local telecommunications. If competition is what policymakers truly desire, the fact that
competition fares poorly in a forced-hybrid arrangement is all the more reason to explore ways
in which a competitive model can be imposed on
the wireline LECs rather than trying to impose
the wireline LECs' traditional regulatory model
on competitive businesses such as wireless.
2.

Revolutionary Ideas from Europe: Calling Party
Pays

In the early 1980s, when Bell System managers
and engineers were figuring out how to operate a
cellular business, a decision was made to have the
cellular subscriber incur the charges for both incoming and outgoing calls.' 48 Like many other
decisions, it was an attempt to solve problems embedded in the existing wireline rate structure and
was a product of the time in which it was developed. 149 In the moderm mobile communications
marketplace, charges for possibly unwanted incoming calls encourage mobile subscribers to
keep their phones turned off, discourage distribution of the mobile number and generally detract
from the interest in using a wireless phone as a
full substitute for landline.' 50 In Europe, mobile
phone usage is significantly higher than in the
United States-the ratio is as high as five to oneand the fact that the "calling party pays" in Europe likely has a significant role to play in this sit1
uation. 15
Indeed, the Chairman of the FCC agrees that
calling party pays would increase the number of
minutes carried on wireless phones.' 52 But even
with the support of the FCC Chairman, changing
the present arrangement in the United States is
27 F.C.C. 359).
148
LULAR
149

See Henry M. Lucas, Who Paysfor Incoming Calls?, CELBus. MAG., Nov. 1991, at 48.
See DR. JOSEPH N. PELTON,

TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

THE REGULATIONS

THE

WIRELESS AND SATELLITE

TECHNOLOGY,

THE

MARKET

&

181-84 (1995).

150
See Pradnya Joshi, Cellular Dialers: It's Your Dime/
AT&T to Test 'CallingParty Pays'Plan,NEWSDAY, Jan. 28, 1998,
at A46.
151
See Comments of AirTouch Communications, Inc., to

In re Calling Party Pays Service Option in the Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, Inc., WT Dkt. No. 97-207, at 9-11

(Dec. 16, 1997).
152
See William E. Kennard, Crossing Into The Wireless Century, Remarks to the CTIA Convention, Feb. 9, 1999.
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likely to be difficult. Accordingly, one might ask
why the U.S. "called-party-pays" system was
adopted in the first place. There were a number
of reasons for this decision. First, cellular system
managers sought to develop a rate structure that
recovers traffic-sensitive costs without relying on
153
averages and assumptions about usage patterns.
Telephone company executives learned that usage assumptions proved less reliable than desired
for purposes of revenue planning and network engineering.1

54

The industry was also undergoing a

great deal of turmoil associated with the introduction of long-distance competition, which raised a
number of difficult questions concerning such
jointly provided services as revenue distribution,
where one carrier is expected to bill or collect rev155
enue for another carrier's costs.

Charging for both incoming and outgoing calling required much less effort in terms of estimating demand levels for the functions that create
traffic-sensitive costs.' 56 It avoided some of the
problems of negotiating revenue sharing arrangements with other network carriers. It was also simple and easy for customers to understand.1

57

The

early cellular customer was likely to be an individual or business that had some experience with
mobile communications; most paging systems and
two-way radio systems charged for incoming
calls.1 58 These customers also saw cellular in
terms of the additional benefit of near-universal
accessibility, a very attractive capability reflecting a
business orientation in which a subscriber would
See Lucas, supra note 148, at 48.
See id.
155
See id.; Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
15,991, paras. 20-21. See generally In re Investigation of Access
and Divestiture Related Tariffs, MTS and WATS Market
Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 98 F.C.C. 2d 730
(1984); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 830 (1988); In re MTS and
WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1127 (1986); In re Investigation of Access
and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Order, 1 FCC Rcd. 84 (1986).
156
See Lucas, supra note 148, at 48.
157
See id. at 50.
158
See id.
159
States retain authority to regulate the "other terms
153
154

and conditions" of CMRS service, such as CMRS billing arrangements. See 47 U.S.C. §332(c) (3).
160
See, e.g.,
In re Detariffing of Billing and Collection
Services, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C. 2d 1150 (1986) [hereinafter Detariffing Order] (ruling that LEC billing and collection
provided to IXCs is an administrative, not a communications
service). The Detariffing Order, however, only addressed bill-
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pick up the costs of calls from clients and colleagues.
Today's mobile communications market is
quite different. As a result of competition, technical innovation and investments based on expected
future growth, demand has exploded and prices
have fallen. Mobile telephony is being marketed
less as a premium, supplemental service and more
as a mass market telecommunications service.
Continued growth of the industry coupled with
reform of wireline prices could make mobile services a competitive alternative to wireline local exchange service. If regulators are truly interested
in encouraging such a trend, calling party pays is
worth looking into.
A calling-party-pays arrangement in the United
States would have three parts:
(1) A CMRS carrier offers its wireless subscribers a calling-party-pays billing option as part of its
service contract. Perhaps for a small monthly fee,
the carrier agrees that the wireless subscriber will
not be billed for incoming calls. This is a CMRS
billing arrangement within the "other terms and
conditions" language of section 332;159
(2) The CMRS carrier purchases standard
third-party billing services from the major wireline
LECs. The CMRS carrier may also contract with a
clearinghouse services firm who in turn obtains
billing services from the major wireline LECs.
These LEC billing services may or may not be
tariffed; they are generally not considered com160
mon carrier services;

ing and collection services provided by LECs to unaffiliated
IXCs. The FCC has never addressed the far different situation of billing and collection for CMRS carriers who are of-

fering CPP billing arrangements to enhance local competition with incumbent wireline carriers. The Commission has
overruled the Detariffing Order it in part, finding that LEC
billing and collection is in fact properly considered a com-

munications service. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning
Local Exchange Carrier Validation and Billing Information
for Joint Use Calling Cards, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd.
3528, 3533 n.50 (1992). The Commission also has recently

reiterated that billing and collection services are not common carriage. See In re Access Charge Reform, Third Report
and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 22,430, 22,430, para. 1 n.2 (1997).

However, the Federal-State Joint Board, when considering
truth in billing matters, recently concluded otherwise. See In
re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Second Recommended Decision, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,744, para. 70 (1998) ("We
believe that a carrier's billing and collection practices for

communications services are subject to regulation as common carrier services under Title II of the Act").
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(3) The party originating a call to a CMRS subscriber who has elected calling party pays hears a
preamble message informing them of the charges
and asking them to take a specific action, e.g.,
press "1" to complete the call. The originating
party is a purchaser of CMRS telecommunications
services on a "casual calling" basis, similar to 1010-XXX "casual calling" long-distance services.
A calling-party-pays arrangement is likely to be
more economically efficient overall, in that consumers can better control what they spend for
both incoming and outgoing telecommunications. Presently, wireless customers can control
what they spend only indirectly, by not using their
services for incoming calls to the extent they
otherwise would. The consequence is that wireline customers are not obtaining the full benefits
of calling a mobile subscriber who would otherwise be reached more often. One of the unique
features of mobile is that the calling party generall4 expects to get the individual called, rather
than a receptionist or voice mail, a feature that
would make it more attractive for outbound calling to many consumers. 6 1
Neither party-the call originator or the call receiver-is getting as much as they could from
wireless as they otherwise would demand if pricing signals were correct. This distortion in consumer choices is referred to by economists as a
welfare loss.1 6 2 Calling party pays addresses this

problem by removing some of the incentives for
wireless customers to discourage incoming calls,
as well as encouraging them to use the wireless
services they would otherwise select. It also benefits calling parties, who are more likely to reach
the desired party on the first call.
The present environment also fails to link the
costs of a call with the party valuing whether to
make the call or not. This produces additional
welfare losses because it artificially discourages
the use of CMRS and favors the use of wireline
services for certain calls. Calling party pays sends
161 As Jerry Seinfeld quipped about dialing someone's
car phone and letting it ring nine to ten times: "What, are
they in the back seat and can't get to the phone?"
162

See generally DONALD STEVENSON WATSON, PRICE THE-

ORY AND ITS USES 7-8 (1963).
163 In Europe, notice is usually

provided by the fact that
a wireless number has a separate, distinct area code. In the
United States, the 1+ dialing convention could similarly be
used, because the 1+ is customarily used to indicate a "toll"
call, for which separate charges apply.
164 See Salomon Smith Barney, Wireless Quarterly, Dec. 9,

more accurate price signals to the wireline customer. This places CMRS on a more equal footing with wireline services and makes it more likely
that consumers will see the benefits of competitive substitutes for local exchange services: lower
prices and more innovative services.
So far, this is fine in theory, but the results with
calling party pays in practice have been mixed. In
many states, such as California, ILECs and regulators have effectively blocked introduction of a calling-party-pays option by refusing to bill originating callers a separate charge for calling a wireless
phone. At one point, the issue was whether the
originating caller would have sufficient notice;
that has been largely overcome by voice prompts
that inform the originating caller of the charges
and the reasons for them. 16 3 Rather, regulators

and ILECs are particularly opposed to calling
party pays because of its implications for wireline
service prices. ILECs oppose having to include
separate wireless charges on their bills because it
reduces their ability to sell their own vertical services on the same bill and, like the regulators, they
would prefer not to deal with educating consumers about the change in convention. Also, the
jury is still out on what consumers might actually
prefer. Where cheap local calling is the expected
norm, calling party pays may well discourage calls
to wireless phones and prove of only marginal
value to wireless customers with large bundles of
use. In order to ascertain whether this is the case,
there is therefore every reason to push ahead with
market trials of calling-party-pays arrangements,
where LEC cooperation permits.
It is not beyond the realm of possibility to think
that the ILECs also are concerned about the ability of calling party pays to affect their competitive
position vis-;I-vis wireless services. In Europe,
there is evidence that the fixed operators are interested in maintaining high prices to call mobile
phones in order to discourage substitution of mobile for fixed for incoming calls. 164 In the United
1998, at 43. European regulators have, in fact, been investigating wireline-to-mobile call prices to determine whether

they are "excessive" and therefore a violation of European
antitrust law. The European Commission's antitrust wing, the
Directorate General IV, collected data from all European
Community operators and elected to investigate further in
only two cases: Germany and Italy. The investigation never
fully established a competition law case, but it did prompt
operators into voluntary price decreases, after which the
Commission closed the Investigation. See Commission successfully closes investigation into mobile and fixed telephony prices fol-
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States, where we have a called-party-pays arrangement, ILECs would have the opposite incentive:
keep the price of calling a fixed phone low relative to the price of calling a mobile phone to discourage substitution of mobile for fixed for incoming calls. And as noted before, regulators are
adamantly opposed to any changes in local telephone service prices regardless of whether the
change would enhance competition. 165
Again, ILEC and regulatory opposition are not
the only problems with introducing a callingparty-pays arrangement; they are merely the main
legal and political issues. Wireless carriers have
plenty of responsibility for developing callingparty-pays arrangements that work. Here too,
technical issues such as the ability to identify the
originating party and properly bill them-"leakage" in industry parlance-will play an enormous
role in determining whether calling-party-pays arrangements will effectively boost wireless as an effective competitor for wireline services. Wireless
calling-party-pays arrangements are presently
available in a number of states, but their success
has been mixed. In some cases, the attractiveness
of the product is significantly diminished because
the wireless carrier must bill any uncollectible
charges back to the wireless subscriber.
But technical issues have one distinguishing
characteristic that makes them much easier to
deal with than legal and policy issues: they are, for
better or worse, within the control of the carrier.
Carriers who are not meeting consumer needs
will be punished in the marketplace for not offering services made available by other, more technically advanced competitors. Moreover, calling
party pays, like rate rebalancing and elimination
of anti-competitive subsidies, addresses the factor
CMRS consumers value most: the price of service.
Other factors are likely both to be less important
and to be addressed by carriers in response to
consumer demand. They do not require action
by regulators to accelerate the likelihood that
lowing significant reductions throughout the EU, May 4, 1999

<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pressre.htm>. In the
U.K., the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC)

found that there was insufficient competition so far and imposed a price regulation scheme. However, the MMC predicted that effective competition could arise in as soon as

three years. The MMC rejected the somewhat radical view
that call termination was inherently a bottleneck source of
market power. See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Reports on references under section 13 of the Telecommunications Act
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broadband CMRS will be a viable substitute for
traditional wireline local telephone service.
For example, to the extent there are consumers
who would leave their phones on at all times but
for battery life issues, there will be many more
such consumers where they have the option of
not paying for incoming calls. Carriers are more
likely to speed deployment of digital service and
develop other solutions to battery life issues where
calling party pays is available and consumers no
longer have a price disincentive to restrict incoming calls. Calling party pays has a number of complicated aspects, but if the question is what policy
changes would encourage wireless to be a more
robust competitor with wireline, calling party pays
is one policy issue that ought to be addressed.
B.

End the Jurisdictional Anarchy

Improving the environment for wireless to become a full substitute for wireline service involves,
in large part, addressing wireless concerns that
their growth as a telecommunications competitor
will not cause them to be subject to the traditional
rubric of wireline regulation. As recent events
have shown, jurisdictional questions have a key
role to play in the local competition debate generally. Wireless is not entirely removed from these
jurisdictional questions. The question is not who
will regulate wireless; as long 'as the regulation is
modest and sensible, it does not matter whether
federal or state commissions have the authority.
Rather, the question is whether jurisdictional issues created by distinctions that do not fit wireless
well cause such uncertainty as to deter wireless
from pursuing business strategies that put them in
a better position to capture access lines from wireline competitors. Ending the jurisdictional anarchy will help encourage competition and also
help in the progress toward a competitive, deregulated telecommunications market in general.
Telecommunications is inherently a service per1984 on the charges made by Cellnet and Vodafone for terminating
calls from fixed-line networks (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <www.oftel.

gov.uk/pricing/cmmcl298.html>. The MMC's prediction is

even more likely to come true if mobile becomes an effective
substitute for wireline in the market for call origination. As a
general matter, facilitating substitution of mobile for wireline
services should permit greater deregulation of wireline carriers and should not require new regulation of mobile.
See supra note 144.
165
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mitting two persons in geographically distinct areas to communicate as if they were near. Broadband CMRS takes this concept a step further,
tying the communications ability to the person
themselves, rather than to a fixed point. This
"anytime, anywhere" mobile communications,
although especially well-suited to our more active
21st century lifestyle, is unfortunately still likely to
be subject to a 19th century jurisdictional framework. As noted above, in 1993, Congress began
with the correctjurisdictional premise concerning
broadband CMRS: it operates "without regard to
state lines."1 66 Nevertheless, Congress, facing significant political pressure, was unable to enact
legislation that recognizes this principle in full.
Congress preempted only state regulation of
"rates and entry" while preserving state authority
over "other terms and conditions"-phrases as
subject to creative interpretation as any in the
Communications Act. 1 67 Ambiguity as to what
these regulations permit state regulatory commissions to do has created confusion for states and
broadband CMRS carriers alike. Even well-meaning state regulators have struggled to discern the
scope of their jurisdiction under the "other terms
and conditions" language.
The phrase "other terms and conditions" was
indicated by the legislative history to mean "such
matters as customer billing information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer
protection matters; facilities siting issues (e.g., zoning); transfers of control; the bundling of services
and equipment; and the requirement that carriers
make capacity available on a wholesale basis, ' 1 6 8
but this description of the scope of "other terms
and conditions" cannot be taken as conclusive.
Among other things, it is extremely difficult to see
how a state could require carriers to make capacity available on a "wholesale" basis without regulating rates. For one, the term "wholesale" is not
defined, and any definition would require a spe166
H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587.
167
Congress had somewhat of a head start, in that it had
initially preempted state regulation of rates or entry with respect to "private land mobile service" in 1982, see H.R. Rep.
No. 97-765, at 54 (1982), and the 1993 revisions were intended to bring parity to the regulation of competing private
and public land mobile services through the new category of
CMRS.
168
H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
169
See, e.g., California Wireless Resellers Ass'n v. Los Angeles

cific discount from "retail." In practice, states
have concluded that they have little or no authority to require a specific wholesale margin or otherwise regulate the resale offerings of CMRS carri169
ers.
The fine line between "regulation of rates" and
"regulation of terms and conditions" is particularly difficult to find when one recognizes, as has
the U.S. Supreme Court, that "[r]ates ... do not
exist in isolation. They have meaning only when
one knows the services to which they are attached"; thus, a prohibition on 'discrimination in
charges' must include non-price features, otherwise a carrier could defeat the broad purpose of
the statute by the simple expedient of providing
170
an additional benefit at no additional charge.
By the same logic, a prohibition on "regulation of
charges" must include non-price features, otherwise the broad purpose of the statute could be defeated by the simple expedient of requiring additional benefits or services at no additional charge.
Accordingly, state regulatory commissions cannot
be permitted to require broadband CMRS carriers to offer particular benefits or services, consistent with the prohibition on regulation of rates
contained in section 332. What this leaves within
the authority to regulate "other terms and conditions" is difficult to see.
Additional ambiguity is created by the interstate/intrastate distinction contained in section
2(b) of the Communications Act, as well as the
use of the concepts "local exchange" and "interexchange" services. With respect to the interstate/intrastate issue, section 2(b) provides that
nothing in the Act shall be deemed to apply or to
give the FCC jurisdiction over "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations
for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier."' 71 As
another commentator has noted, this arrangement is an antiquated arrangement, "rooted in
Cellular Tel. Co., No. 98-06-055 (Calif. Pub. Util. Comm'n
Nov. 5, 1998). See also Nova Cellular West v. AirTouch Cellular,
No. 98-02-036 (Calif. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 3, 1998) (reseller complaint alleging discriminatory service provision dismissed due to lack ofjurisdiction because injunction against
CMRS carrier's charges and award of rate refund by state
commission is not permitted under section 332).
170
American Tel. and Tel. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 1956, 1963 (1998) (citing Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n
v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
171

47 U.S.C. §152(b).
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the monopolistic origins of landline

ony." 172

teleph-

The traditional test of whether a service is interstate or intrastate in nature is to compare the end
points of the call. Even services routed through
out-of-state switches, for example, are intrastate if
the call originates and terminates within the state.
But broadband CMRS carriers do not sell individualized services capable of this type of analysis.
First, broadband CMRS coverage areas do not recognize state boundaries. Second, because the service permits mobile communications, an individual call may begin as intrastate, become interstate
and either terminate or become intrastate again.
Such occurrences are far from unusual, particularly in areas such as New York City/New Jersey,
Kansas City, Mo:, and Kansas City, Kan., and Cincinnati, Ohio, and Kentucky.
Thus, requirements permitting states to regulate intrastate services while reserving interstate
broadband CMRS services to the FCC are inherently unworkable even on a call-by-call basis. For
example, in implementing section 332, the FCC
elected to utilize that section's forbearance authority to forbear from section 203 of the Communications Act and other related sections related to tariffing. In fact, the FCC determined
that even permitting the filing of tariffs, in the
case of competitive carriers, is not in the public
interest and should be prohibited. 173 At the same
time, however, the FCC addressed its prohibition
only to tariffs for interstate CMRS services. The
FCC provided that "States may require CMRS
providers to file terms and conditions for their in174
trastate services."'
As a result, some states such as Kentucky continue to require cellular carriers to file tariffs setting forth the terms and conditions of their service. Of course, these terms and conditions
legally govern only "intrastate" cellular services.
Interstate cellular services are governed not by
tariff, but by the terms and conditions of the contract with the subscriber. 175 Thus, apparently, a
cellular customer leaving their home in Kentucky
on the way to work in Ohio calling to a party also
172

See Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 27, at 560.

See CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
1479-80, para. 178. The FCC also concluded that the volun173

tary filing of tariffs is an "unreasonable practice under section 201 (b) of the Act." Id.
174 Id. at para. 179.
175

Customary legal doctrine holds that where a corn-
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in Kentucky begins their call subject to the legal
terms and conditions in the tariff, but as they
cross the bridge into Ohio, their call then becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the
contract. The possibility for consumer confusion
and dissatisfaction in these absurd conditions is
high, while the consumer benefit of state regulation of the terms and conditions is extremely low.
That local competition, including competition
from wireless, involves reform of jurisdictional
boundaries based on the interstate/intrastate nature of telecommunications traffic was made clear
in the Supreme Court's most recent discussion of
section 2(b) and the 1996 Telecommunications
Act. 1 76 There, the Court found that the 1996 Act
fundamentally restructures local telephone markets and gives the FCC authority over local competition, even to the extent that it involves intrastate service. That, coupled with the fact that
CMRS operators must obtain federal licenses to
use their assigned radio spectrum, suggests that
an exclusively federal arrangement for wireless
regulation is appropriate.
Certainly broadband CMRS carriers expect to
observe state commercial regulations applicable
to any business selling service in a given state or,
for example, to pay state sales taxes for sales made
within the state. But states must recognize that
broadband CMRS carriers are not like, cannot be
regulated like and should not be expected to operate like, wireline LECs. The problem with uncertainty regarding state jurisdiction is not so
much that a state commission would over-regulate
broadband CMRS, although that is the case in
some states. Most states have fully detariffed
broadband CMRS services and employ only generally applicable trade practices regulation. Rather,
the point is that there is significant regulatory uncertainty created about whether broadband
CMRS will somehow change its regulatory status
should it begin to win primary access line subscriptions away from ILECs in any significant
number.
Accordingly, the way forward regarding state
authority over CMRS need not eliminate the abilmon carrier's terms and conditions are filed in a public tariff,
those terms and conditions supersede any terms in a contract
for the same services, even if the terms and conditions of the
contract were individually negotiated. See Central Office, 118
S. Ct. at 1962-63.
176
See AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 729-30
(1999).
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ity of states to monitor commercial transactions
within their borders. But it must recognize that
broadband CMRS do not operate with regard to
those borders and that they are not to be subjected to new, more burdensome regulations, as a
consequence of attempting to develop business
through competition with wireline LECs. Wireline regulation is a consequence of their market
power, while broadband CMRS are provided in a
competitive market, regardless of whether they
are competing directly with LECs and other carriers for line subscriptions or only indirectly for
minutes. As new competitors, CMRS carriers will
not have such market power and need not be subject to parallel regulation.
In order to grow, CMRS will offer a wide variety
of service options and innovations; their services
will look and operate like wireline local exchange
services only to the extent that consumers demand similar features. To the extent that customers seek to substitute broadband CMRS for traditional wireline services, it will be up to broadband
CMRS carriers, not regulators, to see that those
consumer demands are met. In time, of course,
the same will be true for wireline LECs and the
appropriate action at that juncture will be to eliminate any unnecessary regulation of those carriers
that remains.
Congress should eliminate the confusing distinction between "rates and entry" and "other
terms and conditions." Service rates and service
terms and conditions are too closely related-two
sides of the same coin, in the Supreme Court's
words-to serve as a meaningful distinction. In
Central Office, Justice Scalia noted that section 203
of the Communications Act avoids confusion between rates and services by prohibiting not merely
discrimination in "rates," or even "charges," but
"also 'the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges."' 177 Congress could
better further the intent of the 1993 revisions and
clarify the scope of state regulations by utilizing
this more traditional language to describe the
scope of state preemption.
While state commissions should not be regulating any aspect of broadband CMRS, this is not to
say states must be completely powerless with respect to broadband CMRS carriers. CMRS carriers
as companies do have a recognizable jurisdictional
situs. A broadband CMRS carrier who chooses to
177

Central Office, 118 S. Ct. at 1963 (citing 47 U.S.C.

make service subscriptions available to the public
in a given state would likely, for example, have
sufficient "contacts" with that state to be amenable to civil suits in that state's courts. States need
not be left powerless to address legitimate concerns under generally applicable commercial and
consumer protection provisions of state law.
Wireless carriers have in fact offered such an approach to state authorities in Ohio, although it
has yet to be acted upon. Specifically, CMRS carriers have proposed that they be subject to the
Ohio uniform commercial practices code, enforced by the state Attorney General, rather than
the Public Utilities Commission. This is a step in
the right direction.
Finally, the concepts of "exchange" services and
"interexchange" services are also problematic for
wireless carriers. The Commission has traditionally considered CMRS as providing primarily local
exchange services, and as potential competitors to
traditional local exchange carriers in a market for
substitutable services, it might seem rational to
classify such broadband CMRS as local exchange
services. Furthermore, the Communications Act
provides that CMRS carriers are not to be considered "local exchange carriers" unless and until
the FCC makes an affirmative finding that they
should be so treated-implicitly suggesting that
CMRS carriers should be so classified should they
begin to win line subscriptions away from traditional LECs in any serious numbers.
But classifying broadband CMRS carriers in this
fashion would be problematic. First and foremost, it would be largely impossible to apply the
traditional terms "exchange" and "interexchange"
services in a consistent manner. The term "exchange" services is no doubt derived from Theodore Vail's wireline Bell System, constructed as an
interconnected set of local switches, each serving
a defined geographic area and corresponding to a
defined portion of the telephone numbering system. Wireless services are provided over a wide
variety of geographic areas: local, regional, and
even national, with a wide variety in pricing and in
what is considered "local" and what is "long-distance" or "toll" service..
The 1934 Communications Act also embodies
the exchange/interexchange distinction as not
only one of geography, but as one of pricing.
Those services for which an extra charge applies,
§203(a)).
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in addition to the monthly line rental, are known
as "toll" services.17 8 Other services for which the
price is covered by the monthly line rental are
"telephone exchange service.

' 179

These distinc-

tions are difficult to apply to CMRS because its
carriers are not licensed nor do they operate on
an exchange-by-exchange basis. A CMRS carrier,
for example, might have the entire nation as a "local calling area" covered by a fixed monthly
charge. The term "interexchange service" is not
defined in the Act.
For a variety of reasons, the FCC has described
cellular service as "exchange telephone" service,'8 0 although it has also found that CMRS can
provide "interexchange telecommunications service." 1 8 1 The determination that CMRS provides

"exchange service" derives from the fact that the
Act provides that any service "comparable" to
traditional telephone exchange service also qualifies as "exchange service" for purposes of the Act.
As the FCC explained, neither the arguments that
CMRS traffic flows differ, that termination costs
differ, that CMRS have different service areas, nor
the fact that CMRS are not LECs, changes the fact
that certain broadband CMRS carriers provide
"telephone exchange service" through the "comparability" provision of the Act's definition of that
2
service.1 1
The FCC's analysis is correct as far as it goes.
But the FCC's conclusion that services are "comparable" is based on the fact that CMRS also provide "local, two-way switched voice service as a
principal part of their business."' 8 3 Not only does
178
See 47 U.S.C. §153(48) ("The term 'telephone toll
service' means telephone service between stations in differ-

ent exchange areas for which there is made a separate charge
not included in contracts with subscribers for exchange service.").
179 See 47 U.S.C. §153(47).
180

See, e.g., In re the Need to Promote Competition and

Efficient Use of Spectrum For Radio Common Carrier Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)

this beg the question of what is "local," it provides
no coherent or logical basis for the predictable
application of the "exchange/interexchange" distinction to CMRS. One of the most attractive service offerings developed by CMRS carriers is the
single per-minute rate for wide area-even nationwide-calling. This type of service is likely to
be one of the arrangements that proves most successful in winning line subscriptions from wireline
carriers, because it offers a competitive substitute
for both wireline local and long-distance subscriptions. More to the point, to the extent that broadband CMRS carriers offer such a plan, their services are equally "comparable" to wireline
interexchange long-distance services as to local
telephone services.
The FCC's motivation here may have been wellintentioned: by classifying CMRS as "exchange"
service providers, comparable to LECs, the FCC
could then require LECs to offer the same reciprocal compensation arrangements they offer to
wireline CLECs and CMRS carriers, at least for
the same categories of traffic.18

4

But the fact re-

mains that the exchange/interexchange definition cannot be applied in any predictable way.
The only predictable conceptual model is based
on the assumption that CMRS services are priced
as LEC services are priced: "local" calls covered by
a monthly line rental with calls outside the "local"
area subject to an extra charge. But that assumption is entirely incorrect in the case of the broadband CMRS pricing plans most likely to capture
line subscriptions from LECs.
Communications Act, a LEC has the duty "to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications." See 47 U.S.C. §251(b) (5).

The FCC recast this phrase to apply only to "transport and
termination of local exchange service." See Local Competition
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16,018, para. 1045. For the purposes of
reciprocal compensation, the FCC selected the largest licens-

ing area, the MTA, as the "local service area" for CMRS traffic
to avoid artificial distinctions between CMRS providers. See
id. at 16,014, para. 1036. This re-reading of the statute was

1275 (1986).
181 See, e.g., In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Implementation of Sec-

necessary to preserve the distinction between local traffic,

tion 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9564, 9566 (1996) [hereinafter
Section 2 5 4 (g) Order].
182
See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16,000,

of course necessary because the access charges continue to
include a number of implicit subsidies to local service prices.
The FCC's claim that the distinction is preserved in the Act is

para. 1015.
183 Id. at 15,999, para. 1013.
184 See id. at 16,018, para 1045. Of course, this was unnecessary because the Act does not require that telecommu-

nications traffic be classified as local for purposes of reciprocal compensation.

Under section 251(b)(5) of the

subject to reciprocal compensation, and "long-distance" traffic, subject to access charges. Preserving the distinction was,

not entirely honest. But at least, as an economic matter, the
FCC recognizes that the rates for transport and termination
of local and long distance services should ultimately converge
(because they involve the same network functions). See id. at
16,012-13, para. 1033.
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This problem is not so serious an obstacle to
CMRS' evolution into a LEC competitor as some
of the other issues, e.g., subsidies and pricing distortions. But regulatory uncertainty does chill
business innovations and can often lead to distracting and costly litigation. Consumers would
benefit from the absence of continued uncertainty. Moreover, as wireline carriers begin to
provide both "local" and "long-distance" services,
combine the charges on a single bill and possibly
develop nationwide rate plans, the distinction will
lose its meaning for those carriers as well, making
8 5
the time for reform particularly appropriate. 1
At a minimum, policymakers-Congress if necessary-should clarify that CMRS services are
neither exchange nor interexchange, but simply
telecommunications services. To the extent this
requires clarification, the FCC should provide
that CMRS carriers are not subject to LEC access
charges. The only utility of the exchange/interexchange distinction is to identify those services
for which an interconnecting carrier pays the LEC
through regulated access charges, rather than negotiated interconnection arrangements. As the
FCC has recognized, the long term policy goal
should be to align LEC-interexchange carrier interconnection arrangements with the arrangements through which LECs interconnect and exchange traffic with all types of other carriers.
Inter-carrier arrangements should be commercially negotiated among the parties, with regulatory oversight to the extent that LECs retain, market power through control of bottleneck facilities.
Accordingly, reform directed at encouraging competition from CMRS carriers can be seen as a first
step toward a fuller program of deregulatory reform. There is no need to perpetuate the exchange/interexchange services distinction for
anyone once access charge reform is completed.
C.

Forswear Investment Mandates
As noted above, one important feature of the

185 The FCC is presently wrestling with application of the
rate integration provisions of the Communications Act to the

"interstate, interexchange" services of CMRS carriers, and
finding that determining which CMRS services constitute "interexchange" CMRS services is largely impossible. See, e.g., In
re Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications
Act of 1934, FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket
96-61, FCC 99-43 (April 21, 1999).
186
See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§66-2002(k), 66-2005 (Supp.
1998).

traditional, regulated model for telecommunications is that it enhanced the ability of regulators
to "steer" investment decisions by the regulated
entities, either to further infrastructure growth in
general or to reward politically favored constituencies. In a pro-competitive, deregulated market,
of course, such decisions would be left to the business judgment of individual carriers. High-speed,
broadband services are certainly attractive for
many purposes, but their deployment will proceed most efficiently where the resources needed
follow market demand
More directly, broadband CMRS carriers, as
noted above, likely have little interest in competing for such subscriptions where it is necessary to
win away subsidies as well in order to be pricecompetitive. But even if a CMRS carrier is interested in competing in a subsidized environment,
it will likely not find it sound business strategy to
develop service packages that win away line substitutions from LECs if they are required by regulators to invest in a particular level of service in order to do so.
* Some state commissions have recently attempted to both claim that they are introducing
competition while simultaneously retaining con.trol over investment decisions through the eligi;bility requirements for state universal service
funds; this would extend such control to wireless
carriers who seek to obtain eligibility status. The
Kansas state legislature, for example, passed a statute in 1996 that requires each local exchange carrier to file a network infrastructure plan with the
state regulatory commission (the Kansas Corporation Commission or "KCC"), explaining how it
will deploy "enhanced universal service" byJuly 1,
2003.186 "Enhanced universal service," as presently defined by the KCC, requires the deployment of additional capabilities beyond basic telephone service, e.g., Signaling System 7 with
CLASS, l s 7 basic and primary rate ISDN,"' full-fi-

ber interconnectivity between central offices and
the provision of broadband services upon request
187
Signaling System 7 is a technical protocol for out-ofband network signaling. Out-of-band network signaling, as
opposed to "in-band" signaling, uses as separate data network
rather than the regular phone lines to transmit call set-up
and other information. "CLASS" refers to "Custom Local
Area Signaling Services," such as Caller ID, that are facilitated by SS7 but require additional software upgrades.
188 "ISDN" stands for Integrated Services Digital Network. ISDN equipment permits a regular copper phone line
to be used for simultaneous multi-channel communications,
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to qualifying hospitals, libraries and state and lo18 9
cal government facilities.
Similarly, the State of Washington proposes to
require that any carrier eligible to receive funds
from the state universal service fund provide the
capability to send data at 28.8 kb/s on any access
line-data speeds far above what ordinary telephone lines (or cellular radio channels) can efficiently provide.' 90 The purpose of these "enhanced" universal service requirements appears to
be to preserve the government's ability to dictate
investment in telecommunications infrastructure.
Legislatures and regulators understandably find
that this ability to exercise command and control
over the equipment, investment levels and capabilities of the LEC rate base is a particularly attractive feature of the regulated monopoly environment.
In a competitive environment, however, this becomes less plausible as a variety of carriers seek to
compete by differentiating themselves by varieties
of technology deployed, service quality and available services. Wireless carriers, for example, can
offer the premium feature of mobility, a feature
which involves a considerable level of additional
network expense to provide. It is unfair for government to also direct that wireless carriers must
offer, for example, very high data speeds or other
features in order to be considered eligible for the
subsidies presently enjoyed by their competitors.
The facts of market competition are that if customer demand is such that a carrier who does not
offer certain enhanced services cannot attract customers, that carrier will not succeed in the marketplace. Government edicts to provide a minimum level of advanced service capability,
particularly where it requires up to $100 million
dollars in costs, 19 ' merely stifle competition and
reduces customer choice.
Carriers who do not have the $100 million to
spend on such technology will be automatically
regulated out of the marketplace. Some carriers
will, of course, choose to target certain customer
segments by offering high-capacity broadband
services. But these competitive carriers must ap-

parently pay into the Kansas universal service
fund in order to support advanced technologies
deployed by their competitors,while at the same time
funding their own investments in advanced technology without receivingsubsidies. A more anti-competitive arrangement is hard to imagine.
And the FCC is still, in its syntactically tangled
way, "addressing issues related to public service
obligations for CMRS providers that wireline car-

including both voice and data.
189 See Kan. Stat. Ann. §66-1,18 7 (q) (Supp. 1998) (definition of enhanced universal service).
190 See 98/11/23 UT-980311(r) Universal Service Proposed Rulemaking, Dkt. No. UT-980311(r) (W.U.T.C. Nov.
23, 1998).

Within the Telecommunications Industry in the State of Kansas, Order Addressing Comments Relating to Universal Service and
Requesting Additional Comments, Dkt. No. 190,492-U, 94-GIMT478-GIT, para. 5 (Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n 1998) (citing Com-

191

See In re A General Investigation into Competition

riers are required to provide." 192 It is unclear

what specific public service obligations the FCC
has in mind. Providing consumers with effective
access to emergency services, or ensuring that persons with disabilities are served in a reasonable
way are perhaps "public interest" obligations, but
they are also obligations imposed by the competitive market. Extensive regulatory mandates in
these areas would be unnecessary.
To the extent that the FCC is referring to capabilities and investments beyond those warranted by
consumer demand, it is regressing to the 19th
century model of compelled infrastructure investment mandates attendant to a monopoly environment. That type of approach is highly likely to
both discourage CMRS carriers from positioning
themselves to compete more effectively with wireline LECs and to reduce the ability of CMRS carriers to price services in a manner that permits any
such competition in the first place. At least one
FCC Commissioner, quoted earlier, is in favor of
movement "toward a world in which the market,
rather than bureaucracy, determines how communications resources should be utilized." 19

3

In this

view, the only role for regulation is to address instances in which the market fails to work effectively as a market, not simply where the market
does not yield the results bureaucracy-or, more
politely, government-desires.
Do Not Subject Competitive Carriers to
Rules Intended to Address ILEC Market
Power

D.

As a general matter, if competitive pressure on
wireline ILECs is to come from broadband CMRS

ments of Sprint).
192

193

See supra note 5.
See Powell, supra note 41, at 534.
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carriers (or others who are not themselves wireline LECs), regulation will have to recognize that
pure regulatory parity will neither be necessary
nor will it be possible until the facilities-based carriers in a given market no longer enjoy market
power. There are a number of regulations presently applied to wireline LECs, some of which are
not yet vestiges of the regulated environment and
may need to continue for the time being. The
lon'g-term goal should be a deregulated telecommunications marketplace with no carrier enjoying
market power over the "last mile" connection to a
home or, as in the case of wireless, to an individual. For the short term, if regulators want to encourage broadband CMRS carriers to develop service packages that compete for line subscriptions,
those carriers need to be assured that they are not
inadvertently setting themselves up for additional
unnecessary regulation.
The 1996 Act generally follows the correct approach in identifying where regulation of broadband CMRS and wireline LECs should be the
same and where it should be different based on
differences in market power. The 1996 Act ended
what had become a bruising debate at the FCC
over LEC/CMRS interconnection. 19 4 Although
the FCC had long ago required LECs to compensate CMRS carriers for terminating calls
originated on the landline network, LECs had not
done so in practice.
Some state commissions, moreover, opposed
mutual compensation or "co-carrier" status between LECs and CMRS carriers, reasoning that
any such mutual compensation would increase
the cost of basic telephone service for the provision of "discretionary" cellular service. 195 The
194
See, e.g., In re Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 5020 (1996).
195
See, e.g., Investigation on the Commission's own motion into the regulation of cellular radiotelephone utilities;
and Related Matters, Interim Opinion, 36 C.P.U.C. 2d 464,
99-100 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n June 6, 1990). See also Local

Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 15,925-26, paras. 856-857
(describing instances of state commission discrimination regarding LEC/CMRS interconnection).
196
See 47 U.S.C. §§251(b)(5), 252(d) (2) (A) (i). These
sections by their terms apply only to "local exchange carriers," and the FCC has correctly concluded that, as non-LECs,
CMRS carriers are not requiredby these sections to offer reciprocal compensation to other carriers, but may request such
arrangements from LECs. See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. at 15,996, para. 1006. Importantly, the FCC rejected the

request of some state commissions that a CMRS provider be

1996 Act made it clear that CMRS carriers were to
be afforded mutual compensation for terminating
LEC-originated calls; 196 the FCC's implementation of these requirements was upheld on appeal. 197 Thus, CMRS carriers would finally re-

ceive fair compensation for LEC use of CMRS
networks.
Congress also effectively terminated an FCC
docket examining whether CMRS carriers should
be subject to the same "equal access" rules for access to long-distance carriers imposed on the
BOCs through the antitrust consent decree and
later on all LECs. 198 Cellular carriers affiliated
with BOCs were subject to these requirements
through the decree but others were not; the FCC
was examining how to eliminate this disparity between competing CMRS carriers.
The 1996 Act, recognizing that broadband
CMRS carriers do not control bottleneck facilities,
makes clear that no CMRS carrier shall be required to provide such equal access for long-distance carriers. 19 9 This provision is no small matter; it has effectively paved the way for CMRS
carriers to offer full telecommunications packages
of services and greatly enhanced CMRS' ability to
compete in the local exchange market. This Congressional direction is one that should be borne
in mind when considering whether CMRS carriers
should be brought under the wireline LEC regulatory scheme.
CONCLUSION
The tangled web of contemporary telecommunications policy seriously needs a jackhammer
dose of honesty and candor to resolve whether we
classified as a LEC if it seeks to compete directly with a wireline LEC. Id. at para. 1005.
197
See Local Competition Order,11 FCC Rcd. at 16,016-19,
paras. 1043-45; Iowa Utilities Board, 120 F.3d at 800 n.21;
AT&Tv. Iowa UtilitiesBoard, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). See also In
re Motion to Lift Stay of AirTouch, Order Lifting Stay in Part,
Nos. 96-3321 et. al. (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1996).
198

In re Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations

Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 9 FCC Rcd. 5408
(1994). See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 225, 227
(Modification of Final Judgment section 11 (A)); In re MTS
and WATS Market Structure, Phase III, 100 F.C.C. 2d 860
(1985) (ordering all LECs to offer equal access for interexchange carriers).
199

See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

104, §705, codified at 47 U.S.C. §332(c) (8).
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truly want a "pro-competitive, deregulatory" market for local telephone services. So far, we have
answered the question with only an extremely
qualified yes. Before policymakers can implement the types of policy changes that would encourage broadband CMRS to compete for local
access lines, we need an honest debate about
whether we have reached an acceptable level of
political comfort about the concept. Too many of
the reforms require letting go of comfortable old
policy habits and there is unlikely to be any meaningful movement in the pro-competitive direction
unless the direction forward is discussed openly
and agreed upon with a full understanding of
what it means.
Broadband CMRS carriers, too, will evolve in
unpredictable ways. The next generation of wireless telephones may very well incorporate palmtop computer interfaces and internet capabilities,
as well as improved performance in call clarity
and battery life. They will begin to capture a
larger share of telecommunications minutes and a
higher percentage of both local and long-distance
calling. And wireless phones will become more affordable, be fully accessible to the disabled and
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meet law enforcement and emergency services'
needs.
Now, will wireless phone companies offer live
operators, unlimited flat-rate monthly calling, or
provide high-speed broadband data? Maybe, if
consumer demand requires it. But what they will
not do, at the end of this evolution, is look like
wireline LECs without the wires. Rather, wireless
companies will look like competitive service providers, delivering voice and data as network technology and business discretion suggests.
One may hope they will do so in a regulatory
environment more like that governing bicycle
couriers, overnight delivery services, internet access providers and other competitive businesses
that offer messaging, telecommunications and information services. There will be no government
subsidies, no government investment mandates
and only the usual backdrop of health and safety
regulation. Perhaps incumbent wireline LECs,
too, will someday face competition from wireless
and other firms such that the last vestiges of the
monopoly environment can be filed away in the
telecommunications policy museum. That would
be a revolution of which we can all be proud.

